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PENNSYLVANIA'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S PERSPECTIVE
THOMAS J. RUETER*
AND
JOSHUA H. ROBERTS**
tWHmEN a federal court exercises diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, it
must apply the substantive law as decided by the highest court of the
state whose law governs the action.' When the state's highest court has
not addressed the precise question presented or where state law is unclear,
uncertain or ambiguous, a federal court must predict how the state's high-
est court would resolve the issue. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has held that when forecasting state law, a federal court
"must consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to
show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at hand."
3
The judges of the Third Circuit have commented on the difficulty of the
* United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1977,
University of Scranton; J.D., 1980, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph D. O'Keefe, Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County; B.A., 1997, University of Michigan; J.D., 2000, Temple
University Beasley School of Law. The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable
assistance of Judge Rueter's secretary, Lisa Tipping, and his law clerks, Denise
Speranza, Esquire, Susan Deasy, Esquire and Lisa Sabatino, Esquire. Special
thanks are given to Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi for taking time from his busy
schedule to read our draft and offer comments and suggestions.
1. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that governing
state law must be applied when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 851 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.
1988) (stating that federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must follow law as
interpreted by that state's highest court).
2. See Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1992) (not-
ing that, where issue is left unaddressed by state's highest court, federal court must
predict likely outcome).
3. McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980).
(581)
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court's task. For example, former Judge Arlin M. Adams 4 observed that
"[t]he task of a federal court sitting in diversity is often difficult, for it must
forsake its own expertise and assume that of the foreign state."5 Judge
Dolores K. Sloviter has also written about the difficulty that arises when a
federal court must predict how the highest court of a state would decide
an issue, noting that "[e]ven when there is a state supreme court decision
on point, the direction [of state law] is not always crystal clear."6
Perhaps no other area of the law illustrates the difficulty of applying
state law more than Pennsylvania's reasonable expectations doctrine ("rea-
sonable expectations doctrine" or "doctrine"), which is applied to deter-
mine issues of insurance coverage. The doctrine has its origin in the thesis
espoused by Professor (now United States District Judge) Robert E. Kee-
ton.7 In his seminal two-part article, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with
Policy Provisions, Judge Keeton reviewed numerous court decisions that in-
terpreted insurance policies in favor of insureds.8 After his analysis of the
cases, Judge Keeton opined that the rationale of these decisions could be
reduced to one over-arching principle: "The objectively reasonable expec-
tations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations."9
Since Judge Keeton's article was published some thirty years ago,
courts and members of the academic community have struggled to under-
stand and apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations. As Judge Jane R.
Roth of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
quipped, "Since Professor Keeton's article, a considerable number of trees
have been sacrificed in the name of reasonable expectations as the aca-
demic community has debated what reasonable expectations means,
which courts have adopted the doctrine, and whether it is desirable for
them to have done so."' 0 Judge Marvin Katz of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently observed that the
"exact status of the doctrine [in Pennsylvania] is not entirely clear."11
4. Judge Adams was a member of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
from 1969 to 1987.
5. McKenna, 622 F.2d at 667.
6. Dolores K. Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens
of Federalism, 78 VA. L. Rzv. 1671, 1675-76 (1992).
7. For a discussion of Judge Keeton's thesis on the reasonable expectations
doctrine, see infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Judge Keeton was appointed
Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 1979.
8. See generally Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions (pts. 1 & 2), 83 HARv. L. REv. 961, 1281 (1970) (discussing principles of
regulation regarding insurance contracts).
9. Keeton, supra note 8, at 967.
10. Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303,
1310 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994).
11. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reidler, No. CIV.A.99-4463, 2000 WL 424286,
at *5 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2000).
(Vol. 45: p. 581
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On more than a dozen occasions, the Third Circuit has grappled with
the reasonable expectations doctrine as it has been adopted by the Penn-
sylvania courts. 12 Because of the elusiveness of the doctrine and the in-
consistency of its application by Pennsylvania appellate courts, the Third
Circuit's analysis of the doctrine has likewise been inconsistent. 13 In fact,
certain Third Circuit decisions are incompatible with decisions of the
Pennsylvania courts and with other decisions of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.1 4 In an effort to clarify this difficult area of the law, this Article
will review the applications of the doctrine throughout the country, pro-
vide a detailed history of its utilization by the Pennsylvania courts, discuss
the Third Circuit's implementation of Pennsylvania law and finally, con-
clude with some recommendations.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE
When Judge Keeton initially discussed the reasonable expectations
doctrine, he observed that there were three principles primarily responsi-
ble for creating, as he called them, "rights... at variance with [insurance]
policy provisions." 15 These three principles were: (1) the unconscionable
advantage of the insurer; (2) the reasonable expectations of the applicants
and intended beneficiaries; and (3) detrimental reliance by the insured
upon representations by an insurance company's agent. 16 Keeton ob-
served that these principles have been implemented by the courts through
application of various doctrines, including waiver, estoppel, election, re-
scission and modification.
17
12. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222, 227 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting that ambiguous language should be construed against insurer);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 903 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing Penn-
sylvania courts' use of reasonable expectations doctrine); Bensalem Township, 38
F.3d at 1309 (noting that language of policy indicates parties' intentions); West
Am. Ins. Co. v. Park, 933 F.2d 1236, 1239 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that insured's
reasonable expectations control even when contrary to terms in policy).
13. See Reidler, 2000 WL 424286, at *5 (noting discrepancies in opinions from
Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Courts and Third Circuit regarding reasona-
ble expectations doctrine); Moessner, 121 F.3d at 903-04 (examining Pennsylvania
law regarding reasonable expectations doctrine).
14. SeeJeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expecta-
tions Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 298 (1998) ("Courts in different jurisdictions
have taken a variety of approaches to the [reasonable expectations] doctrine.");
Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1461, 1469 n.40 (1989) (discussing holdings of Pennsylvania Superior
Court as repudiated by Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding reasonable expec-
tations doctrine). See generally Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doc-
trine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21 (1998) (discussing how courts
have interpreted reasonable expectations doctrine over time).
15. Keeton, supra note 8, at 961.
16. See id. at 961-62 (listing principles used to negate an insurer's unconscion-
able advantage).
17. See id. at 962 (describing defenses used to negate unconscionable advan-
tage of insurers).
2000]
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Because of the unique nature of insurance contracts, Judge Keeton
believed it was important to honor the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured in certain circumstances. 18 Insurance contracts are contracts of ad-
hesion in which there is virtually no room for negotiation between the
parties involved. 19 Most insurance contracts are drafted by the insurer,
who maintains an unconscionable advantage over the insured.2 0 Keeton
recognized that courts utilize several regulatory doctrines to balance the
insurer's unequal bargaining power-such as resolving ambiguities in the
insured's favor. In general though, they can all be grouped under the
following broader rubric: "The objectively reasonable expectations of ap-
plicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance con-
tracts will be hcnored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations."2 1
In introducing the reasonable expectations doctrine as a self-standing
principle, Keeton observed some characteristics that he considered neces-
sary to its consistent and correct application. 22 The baseline assumption is
that the policy must be construed from the perspective of a layman and
not according to the interpretation of the educated or sophisticated un-
derwriter. 23 As a result, argued Keeton, the objectively reasonable expec-
tations of the policyholder should control even if the expectations are
contrary to the policy language. 24 Furthermore, an insurer should not be
permitted to use exclusions from coverage that would be inconsistent with
the objectively reasonable expectations of a consumer who possesses an
ordinary degree of knowledge and familiarity with the type of coverage
involved. 25 Few insurance consumers read their entire policy, and some
do not even see the actual policy until after a contract has been signed and
a premium has been paid.26 As a result, Keeton proffered that "not only
should a policyholder's reasonable expectations be honored in the face of
difficult and technical language, but those expectations should prevail as
well when the language of an unusual provision is clearly understandable,
unless the insurer can show that the policyholder's failure to read such
18. See id. at 967 ("[Tlhe terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.").
19. See id. at 966-67 (noting that insurance contracts contain standardized
provisions leaving little room for negotiation).
20. See id. (noting that insurance policy provisions are drafted by insurers).
21. Id. at 967.
22. See id. at 967-69 (discussing necessary implications of principle of reasona-
ble expectations).
23. See id. at 966 (noting that reasonable expectation doctrine allows court to
construe policy in insured's favor).
24. See id. (stating that policyholder's expectations should be honored as long
as they are objectively reasonable).
25. See id. at 968 (noting important corollary to reasonable expectations doc-
trine is regulation of insurer's use of qualifications).
26. See id. (observing that policies are long and complicated and that policy-
holders rarely see their policy before contract is made).
[Vol. 45: p. 581
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/1
2000] REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE 585
language was unreasonable." 27 This, according to Keeton, introduced an
element of certainty and predictability into insurance transactions and en-
abled consumers to understand their legal rights.
28
Judge Keeton found support for his theories in long-standing judicial
practices and beliefs concerning insurance transactions.29 As Judge Kee-
ton noted, the practice of construing contracts from the perspective of a
lay consumer is not new.30 It was Keeton's opinion that although thejudi-
ciary's practice of construing ambiguous terms against the insurer was an
adequate theory to explain the results of some cases, it did not provide the
most desirable explanation. Instead, Keeton argued, there were numer-
ous times when the ambiguity principle was applied in an inconsistent and
confusing manner, even though honoring the reasonable expectations of
the insured would have provided an "alternative and arguably better justi-
fication."3 1 Keeton ultimately concluded that although the reasonable ex-
27. Id.
28. See id. (crediting objectivity of reasonable expectation test with increased
credibility and predictability of insurance transactions).
29. See, e.g., Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J. 1965)
(noting that court will examine reasonable expectations of insured when constru-
ing insurance policy). In Allen, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that:
The [insurance] company is expert in its field and its varied and complex
instruments are prepared by it unilaterally whereas the assured or pro-
spective assured is a layman unversed in insurance provisions and prac-
tices. He justifiably places heavy reliance on the knowledge and good
faith of the company and its representatives and they, in turn, are under
correspondingly heavy responsibility to him. His reasonable expectations
in the transaction may not justly be frustrated and courts have properly
molded their governing interpretative principles with that uppermost in
mind. Thus we have consistently construed policy terms strictly against
the insurer and where several interpretations were permissible, we have
chosen the one most favorable to the assured.
Id.
Likewise, in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1962), the
Supreme Court of California echoed the sentiments of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in stating:
We examine the question in the light of the purpose and intent of the
parties in entering into the contract, Mr. Steven's knowledge and under-
standing as a reasonable layman, his normal expectation of the extent of
coverage of the policy and the effect, if any, of the substitution of the
transportation upon the risk undertaken by the insurer .... A reasona-
ble person, having bought his ticket for a fixed itinerary, and thus having
at the moment of purchase of the policy gained insurance protection for
the whole trip, would normally expect that if a flight were interrupted by
breakdown or other causes, his coverage would apply to substitute trans-
portation for the same flight.
Id. at 288-89 (citations omitted).
30. See Keeton, supra note 8, at 969 (citing Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1947), opinion by Judge L. Hand, which states:
"[A] n underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context, but
the application was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to persons
utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance, who would read it colloqui-
ally. It is the understanding of such persons that counts ... 
31. Id. at 972.
5
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pectations doctrine was only rarely recognized as a viable justification, it "is
a better explanation of results in many cases than a strained rationale such
as that ... of resolving ambiguities against the insurer."3 2
Although hailed as a breakthrough principle in interpreting insur-
ance policies, the doctrine of honoring the reasonable expectations of the
insured was not universally accepted by all jurisdictions in the United
States, and was discussed and modified at great length by academic schol-
ars throughout the country. As one scholar suggested, many courts view
the doctrine as an improper tool forjudicial activism in rewriting an other-
wise unfavorable policy.33 Whether one agrees or disagrees with the doc-
trine, one must conclude that it has had an extremely influential impact
on the law.
When it is used by courts, the doctrine has been applied in roughly
four ways, all of which tend to overlap in many instances. The first applica-
tion of the reasonable expectations doctrine is closely related to the tradi-
tional ambiguity principles that served as part of the foundation for
Keeton's original theory.34 When an insurance contract is susceptible to
two or more reasonable interpretations, an ambiguity is said to exist.35
32. Id. at 973.
33. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107,
109 (1998) (stating doctrine is especially controversial when applied contrary to
clear intent of policy).
34. See id. at 112 (noting that courts "routinely and universally" use reasonable
expectations of consumers to interpret "ambiguous" language in insurance poli-
cies); see alsoJohn Dwight Ingram, The Insured's Expectations Should Be Honored Only
if They Are Reasonable, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 813, 820 (1997) (discussing courts'
tendency to find ambiguity in insurance contracts). Professor Ingram views the
ambiguity principle from a more cynical point of view, noting that:
Courts frequently search for and somehow find an ambiguity to construe
in favor of the insured and against "the deep-pocketed insurer." This
excessive zeal to find an ambiguity is especially prevalent with courts that
are determined to achieve a "fair" result for the insured but are unwilling
to openly espouse the direct approach favored by Keeton, perhaps deem-
ing the latter too radical in terms of traditional contract law.
Id. at 820-21. In fact, Ingram is of the belief that the doctrine of reasonable expec-
tations and the ambiguity principle are completely separate entities, and thus
should not be tied together by courts that consider the reasonable expectations of
the insured when resolving ambiguities. See id. at 822 (urging courts to resolve all
ambiguities against insured). Instead, he argues that ambiguities should be con-
strued against the drafter, and only when there are no ambiguities should a court
even consider looking to the reasonable expectations of the insured. See id. (stat-
ing that reasonable expectations doctrine should never be used to resolve ambigu-
ous language).
35. See Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1052 (1991) (defining ambiguity). In
discussing the formalist-functionalist dichotomy, which Professor Swisher believes
is prevalent in American jurisprudence, he remarked that functionalist judges will
often apply the ambiguity principle in order to justify an expectation of coverage.
See id. at 1059 (comparing formalist application of reasonable expectations doc-
trine to functionalist application of same doctrine). In other words, the judge will
find a so-called "constructive" ambiguity where no such ambiguity really exists. See
id. (noting that functionalist judges create ambiguities to get results they want-
6
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Under the doctrine of contra preferentem,36 the policy is strictly construed
against the drafting party and liberally construed in favor of the non-draft-
ing party.3 7 A number of jurisdictions follow this model.3 8 Courts follow-
ing this version of the doctrine will defer to the reasonable expectations of
the insurance consumer only in cases where the policy is ambiguous.3 9
These courts are generally reluctant to rewrite otherwise unambiguous
policy provisions, regardless of how unequal the provision may seem. 40
The second application of the doctrine occurs when the unconsciona-
ble advantage the insurer has over the insured leads to a situation where
either the insured has been misled or the policy does not reflect the cover-
age the insured requested. This application has been referred to as the
"unconscionability" version of the doctrine.4 1 Although the policy itself
may not be ambiguous in the technical legal sense in which a truly "ambig-
uous" policy would be, it may be ambiguous nevertheless because it is con-
fusing from the standpoint of the typical insurance consumer. 42 The
theory behind applying the reasonable expectations of the insured in this
context is quite simple. The insurance company maintains unequal bar-
recovery for insureds). Another scholar has offered the view that "by sometimes
finding ambiguities where none apparently existed, courts have avoided explain-
ing why an insured's expectations, even though reasonable, should override the
language of the policy." Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made In-
surance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1154
(1981); see also Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1359 n.5 (Pa.
1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is improper for a court to purport to find an
ambiguity where none exists and then to apply the rule of construction which re-
solves ambiguities against the drafter of the document.").
36. See McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 922 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d
Cir. 1990) (describing contract rule adopted by court). This phrase is derived from
the Latin maxim ambigua responsio contra proferentem est accipienda, which translates
"[a]n ambiguous answer is to be taken against him who offers it." Id. at n.2.
37. See Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 1999) (defining
contra preferentem); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy and Good
Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1223, 1302 (1999) (same).
38. See, e.g., Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 926
(Del. 1982) (stating general rule that insurance contract is construed strongly
against insurer and in favor of insured because language that is interpreted was
drafted by insurer); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Idaho
1979) (same); Lambert by Cobb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 820 S.W.2d 602,
603-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Cacavas v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 512
A.2d 423, 425 (N.H. 1986) (same).
39. See, e.g., Hallowel 443 A.2d at 926 (stating that reasonable expectations
rule is not applicable unless policy language is ambiguous).
40. See Ingram, supra note 34, at 821 ("Courts which consider the insured's
reasonable expectations in resolving ambiguities usually accept the limitations that
this should not be used to rewrite the policy and that a clear and unambiguous
coverage provision should be enforced even though it may be surprising or one-
sided.").
41. See Rahdert, supra note 33, at 112 (describing unconscionability applica-
tion of reasonable expectations principle).
42. See id. (stating that although insurance policy is not ambiguous in techni-
cal legal sense, it is confusing from typical policyholder's standpoint).
7
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gaining power over consumers because of its "superior information about
the nature and incidence of particular risks and the legal significance of
language defining or excluding them, industry-wide standardization of
contract terms, poor consumer understanding of the transaction, and de-
liberately cultivated high levels of consumer reliance."
43
Courts use the third application of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine to avoid enforcing the policy language, no matter how clear it may be
or how well it was explained. Such language would, in the courts' view,
defeat the essential objectives of the insurance coverage. 44 This particular
application of the doctrine, although virtually nonexistent in practice, has
43. Id. at 127. A number ofjurisdictions follow the "unconscionability" appli-
cation of the reasonable expectations doctrine. See, e.g., C.P. ex rel. M.I. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Alaska 2000) (noting that insurance contracts that
are ambiguous in sense that they can be interpreted in more than one way will be
construed in favor of insured); West Trucking Line, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 459
N.W.2d 262, 264-65 (Iowa 1990) (explaining doctrine of reasonable expectations
and when it will apply); Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366
N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985) (noting that ambiguity is not condition precedent
to use of reasonable expectations); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Livengood,
970 P.2d 1054, 1059 (Mont. 1998) (describing provisions of reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine); Bromfeld v. Harleysville Ins. Cos., 688 A.2d 1114, 1122 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (same); Mitchell v. Broadnax, No. 25539, 2000 WL 204049, *1
(W. Va. Feb. 18, 2000) (discussing courts' application of Keeton's reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine). Professor Rahdert explained how the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine applies in the unconscionability context:
The essential function of this facet of the reasonable expectations idea is
to secure the basic fairness of policy terms and procedures. It is a broader
doctrine than its contract-law unconscionability cousin, because it is not
limited to cases of extreme one-sidedness. Besides cases of outright sharp
practice (which in insurance are fortunately rare), this variation on the
reasonable expectations theme involves courts in guarding against at least
three kinds of unfair situations: 1) "procedural" unfairness, in which in-
surer marketing practices (including sometimes the practices of agents
subject to insurer control) lead the insured to expect coverage that the
policy language (which the insured is fairly unlikely to read and even
more unlikely to understand) actually purports to exclude; 2) "structural"
unfairness, in which the complex structure and organization of the policy
terms prevent even the most vigilant of ordinary insureds from under-
standing the restrictive scope of protection; and 3) "situational" unfair-
ness, in which one-size-fits-most policy language that might well be fair
and enforceable in many other contexts produces unacceptable restric-
tions on coverage or other rights when applied to the unique circum-
stances of a particular policyholder.
Rahdert, supra note 33, at 127-28.
44. See generally Lauretz v. Alaska Sales & Serv., 828 P.2d 162, 165 (Alaska
1991) (noting that even clear terms and conditions need to be construed in rea-
sonable manner); Radhert, supra note 33, at 113 ("On still fewer occasions, courts
employ the reasonable expectations principle . . . to avoid enforcing policy lan-
guage that, no matter how clearly expressed or fully explained, would defeat what
the court believes are the essential objectives of the insurance policy.") ; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policy Holder Defense in Insurance Coverage Liti-
gation, 4 DRAKE L. REv. 807, 827-29 (1993) (describing manner in which different
states construe insurance provisions). But see Ralph James Mooney, The New Con-
ceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REv. 1131, 1160 (1995) (discussing cases where
[Vol. 45: p. 581
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triggered the most significant debate over its theoretical validity. 45 More
than any other modern application of the doctrine, it bears the closest
relationship to Keeton's original idea of what honoring the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured should entail.46 According to one leading
scholar, under Keeton's original formulation of the theory, "the insurance
policy need not be read at all, which is anathema to a Formalist theory of
insurance contract interpretation." 47 Another author has described this
version of the doctrine as follows:
[T] he Keeton formula suggests that an insured can have reasona-
ble expectations of coverage that arise from some source other
than the policy language itself, and that such an extrinsic expec-
tation can be powerful enough to override any policy provisions
no matter how clear. So interpreted, the Keeton formula pushes
insurance law in a dramatic new direction, one that discards the
traditional [Formalist] contract premise that the written agree-
ment is the controlling code for determining the parties' rights
and duties.
48
courts have used "four-coiner" and "plain-meaning" approach to interpret insur-
ance contract).
45. See Rahdert, supra note 33, at 113 (stating that question whether courts
should have power to apply reasonable expectations doctrine in these instances
has been debatable for last decade).
46. See Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 66 (Alaska
1977) (noting that "it is not required that ambiguities be found in the policy lan-
guage as a condition precedent for [a] construction" of reasonable expectations);
Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After
Two Decades, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 823, 827 (1990) (describing Keeton's doctrine of
reasonable expectations as one that "may affect the substantive provisions of the
policy, regardless of how the policy is drafted").
47. Swisher, supra note 35, at 1054. Professor Swisher describes legal formal-
ism as "the traditional view that correct legal decisions are determined by pre-
existing legal precedent, and the courts must reach their decisions solely based
upon logical deduction, applying the facts of a particular case to a set of pre-ex-
isting legal rules." Id. at 1040. Legal functionalists, on the other hand, prefer
more socially desirable results over legal certainties and logically consistent results.
See id. at 1043 (stating that Legal Functionalists believe Formalist theory of legal
"certainty" is rarely attainable and that concern of law should not be logical consis-
tency, as Formalists believe, but instead, should be socially desirable
consequences).
48. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv.
323, 335 (1986). For an example of the inherent tension faced by courts in apply-
ing the reasonable expectations doctrine in instances where its application may
defeat the clear terms of the policy, one need look no further than Collister v.
Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978). In Collister, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court presumably adopted the doctrine. The majority stated
that "[t]he reasonable expectation of the insured is the focal point of the insur-
ance transaction . . .. Courts should be concerned with assuring that the insur-
ance purchasing public's reasonable expectations are fulfilled." Collister, 388 A.2d
at 1353. However, a critical dissenting opinion stated that "the problem in decid-
ing an insurance claim seems no longer to be one of ascertaining what the con-
tract as written means, but of somehow divining the 'reasonable expectations' of
2000]
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The final theoretical application of the doctrine is not as widely rec-
ognized in scholarly circles, primarily because it is rarely employed. This
application utilizes the reasonable expectations doctrine to avoid policy
limitations that would contradict important public policies regarding com-
pensation. 49 There is no consensus among jurisdictions in the United
States as to which application of the doctrine, if any, is the proper one to
apply. As one commentator has suggested:
Many courts had difficulty embracing a concept that they re-
garded as turning too quickly away from the traditional contract
law principles positing that contract language should be en-
forced as written if it is sufficiently clear. These courts were will-
ing to consider policyholder expectations only if policy language
was ambiguous. Other courts were willing to utilize the Keeton
form of reasonable expectations analysis to overcome clear text,
but only where language favorable to insurers was complex, hid-
den, arguably unfairly surprising, or where the insured was a con-
sumer or small business. 50
According to various scholars, anywhere between ten and thirty-eight
jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine in some form.- 1 The rationale for
the large disparity is the criteria used by individual commentators to deter-
mine whether a jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine. 52 Initially, there
were approximately a half-dozen states, including Pennsylvania, which ap-
parently adopted the pure version of the doctrine as first introduced by
the insured as to what the contract should mean." Id. at 1357 (Pomeroy, J., dissent-
ing). The competing language from Collister has been used as a model example of
the difficulty courts have faced in embracing a particular view on the reasonable
expectations doctrine. See Swisher, supra note 35, at 1054 n.55 (noting differences
between majority Functionalist opinion in Collister and minority Formalist dissent).
49. See Rahdert, supra note 33, at 113-14 (stating that in rare cases courts will
invoke reasonable expectations concept to avoid policy limitations that would con-
travene important public policies regarding assured compensation).
50. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
181, 189-90 (1998).
51. See id. at 191 (noting number of states using doctrine); see also Henderson,
supra note 46, at 827-29 (noting states that have adopted doctrine). It is important
to note that at the time Professor Henderson conducted his study of the jurisdic-
tions, he concluded that as many as 16jurisdictions had adopted the doctrine in
varying forms. See id. at 828. Henderson concluded that there was a strong likeli-
hood that more jurisdictions would adopt the doctrine in upcoming years. See id.
at 834. It appears that approximately 32 jurisdictions have adopted some form of
the doctrine. See Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
912 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla. 1996) (stating that 36jurisdictions have addressed doc-
trine while only 4 have outright rejected it).
52. See Stempel, supra note 50, at 191-92 (noting different criteria).
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Keeton.5 3 That number has since declined.5 4 Tracing the chronology of
the development of the doctrine, one author has found the following:
The 1980s continued to see growth in support for reasonable ex-
pectations analysis but also began to reveal some backpedaling by
courts that had adopted the doctrine as well as less tendency in
other states to embrace the reasonable expectations method.
The cases of the 1990s suggest that the reasonable expectations
"plebiscite" among the states is remaining relatively stable, with
few states changing their respective positions on the doctrine.
5 5
Several justifications have been offered for adopting the doctrine in
one of its various forms. One of the more common justifications is that
the doctrine greatly benefits consumers because it allows them to make a
more fully-informed choice about the precise type of coverage they are
receiving. 5 6 In other words, the expectations principle should encourage
insurance companies to be more exhaustive and more accurate in the in-
formation they distribute to potential customers. 57 Access to more infor-
mation would theoretically enable the consumer to "shop around" for
coverage that would most benefit the insured and meet his or her individ-
ual needs and expectations.
58
A second policy consideration that courts have cited as a justification
for enforcing the reasonable expectations of the insured is equity.59
When there have been misrepresentations on the part of the insurance
salesperson or the language of the policy is confusing, the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured must be upheld to prevent injustice. 60 The justi-
fication for applying the doctrine in the equity context is strengthened or
weakened depending on the role of the insurer in misrepresenting infor-
mation to the customer, and the degree of knowledge the customer pos-
sessed. 61 Regardless of the justification for applying the doctrine, the
insured's expectations must still be reasonable. As the Pennsylvania Supe-
53. See id. at 193 (noting that about six jurisdictions adopted "pure" version of
doctrine).
54. See id. at 193-95 (stating that Idaho, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Minnesota and
New Jersey no longer use pure reasonable expectations doctrine). According to
Stempel, Pennsylvania has since disapproved the pure reasonable expectations
doctrine. See id. at 194-95.
55. Id. at 195.
56. See Abraham, supra note 35, at 1169 (remarking that information about
coverage is central concern of doctrine).
57. See id. at 1169-70 (stating insurer's liability for inaccurate information).
58. See id. at 1170-71 (noting insured's assessment of available coverage).
59. See id. at 1175 (outlining equitable goals of judicially created insurance).
60. See id. at 1179-85 (discussing ramifications of insured's reasonable expec-
tations with regard to coverage).
61. See id. at 1180 (noting ramifications of role of insurer pursuant to doctrine
of equity); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)
("[C]ourts should carefully consider whether an insured of the specified level of
sophistication had reason to know of the existence of the exclusion prior to
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rior Court has aptly stated, "[T]he term 'reasonable expectation' itself,
implies exactly that quality, reasonableness. It is not carte blanche ap-
proval of the insured's wildest and most comprehensive expectation." 62
Although some courts have offered a variety of rationales for enforc-
ing the reasonable expectations of the insured, other courts have repeat-
edly criticized the doctrine. 63 For example, the Utah Supreme Court
emphatically rejected the doctrine in the early 1990s because of its highly
inconsistent application, and because application of the doctrine would
promote judicial activism. 64 Additionally, numerous scholarly articles are
devoted to critiquing the reasonable expectations doctrine. 65 Inconsistent
application and results have been the major criticisms of the doctrine. 66 A
by-product of such application, as leading commentators have suggested,
is that "courts [that are] unable to find any other means of providing in-
surance coverage will turn to the reasonable expectations doctrine to en-
sure a source of funding for victims of tragic circumstances who might
otherwise find themselves without financial resources." 67
Critics of the doctrine have argued that honoring an insured's reason-
able expectations increases transaction costs, particularly by fostering liti-
purchasing or renewing the policy, and hence had effective control over the insur-
ance transaction.").
62. J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 468, 473 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990), rev'd in part and affd in part, 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993).
63. See, e.g., Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 701 P.2d 217, 221 (Idaho 1985)
(stating that Idaho has refused to adopt doctrine of reasonable expectations);
American Country Ins. Co. v. Cash, 524 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (I11. App. Ct. 1988)
(noting that provisions of insurance contracts are to be interpreted according to
their plain language); Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d
1192, 1197 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (declining to rewrite terms to reflect reasonable
expectations); Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804
(Utah 1992) (refusing to invalidate clear provision of insurance contract, even if it
is contrary to insured's reasonable expectations). The Ohio Supreme Court sum-
marized the consensus of the jurisdictions rejecting the doctrine by suggesting the
following:
[T]he reasonable expectation doctrine requires a court to rewrite an in-
surance contract which does not meet popular expectations. Such rewrit-
ing is done regardless of the bargain entered into by the parties to the
contract. Such judicial activism has not been adopted in Ohio by its
courts and the courts' use of liberal rules of construction. Further, this
court declines to do so.
Sterling Merchandise, 506 N.E.2d at 1197.
64. See Allen, 839 P.2d at 804-07 (discussing unwillingness to make sweeping
changes to public policy underlying insurance industry regulation in absence of
legislative direction).
65. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 34, at 832-37 (noting that courts often go be-
yond liberal test for reasonableness); Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quakenbos, Rea-
sonable Expectations After Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425, 433-45
(1998) (noting difficulties courts encounter when applying doctrine); Ware, supra
note 46, at 1475-93 (exploring justifications for doctrine).
66. See, e.g., Popik & Quakenbos, supra note 65, at 426-27 (stating that reason-
able expectations doctrine lacks predictability in its application and its results).
67. Id. at 433.
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gation. 68 Likewise, "[i]f every policy provision is potentially subject to
invalidation on reasonable expectations grounds, an insured whose claim
is denied has a tremendous incentive to challenge any claim denial,
whether or not he or she in fact had an expectation of coverage." 69 The
persistent threat of litigation subsequently raises premium costs as insur-
ance companies provide a way to fund their increased costs.7 0 If ajurisdic-
tion takes a pro-consumer stance, the argument goes that insurance
companies will raise premiums or be less exhaustive in their coverage. 7 1 A
final rationale advanced against application of the reasonable expectations
doctrine is that the government should take a hands-off approach and al-
low parties to contract freely among themselves. 72 As discussed below,
both sides of the academic debate on the reasonable expectations doc-
trine are reflected in the opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which initially embraced the doctrine with enthusiasm, but later retracted
its complete endorsement of the doctrine.
II. PENNSYLVANIA'S APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE
The first case in Pennsylvania to address the issue following Judge
Keeton's introduction of the reasonable expectations doctrine to the legal
landscape was the 1974 decision in Hionis v. Northern Mutual Insurance
Co.73 The plaintiff in Hionis was the owner of a restaurant, including all
improvements and fixtures; however, the plaintiff only leased the land on
which the restaurant was located.7 4 A fire destroyed the restaurant and its
contents-including improvements and fixtures. 75 The plaintiff promptly
notified his insurance carriers of the fire and requested the maximum pay-
ment allowed under his policy. 76 The defendants, insurance companies,
denied the plaintiffs request and instead offered an estimate of damages
for the destroyed personal property far less than what was requested by the
68. See id. at 432 ("When the courts allow the insured to invoke the reasona-
ble expectations doctrine as a basis for defeating an unambiguous policy provision,
transaction costs-especially the cost of litigation-increase as well.").
69. Id.
70. See id. (stating that insurance companies are forced to increase premium
prices to cover litigation costs).
71. See Ingram, supra note 34, at 836-37 (discussing results of judicial excess
with regard to insurance coverage).
72. See Ware, supra note 14, at 1482 (arguing that natural economic interplay
between consumers and insurers yields better contractual deals than standard
forms).
73. 327 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
74. See Hionis, 327 A.2d at 363.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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plaintiff.77 At trial, the coverage limits of the policy were not contested. 78
The insurers argued, however, that the policy itself specifically limited the
amount of coverage in the event that the insured failed to repair or re-
place the improvements or fixtures destroyed in the fire.7 9 As a result, the
insurance companies contended that the plaintiff was only entitled to the
fair and reasonable value of the improvements prorated for the unexpired
term of the lease.8 0
The trial court examined the circumstances surrounding the issuance
of the insurance policies to the plaintiff.8 1 The plaintiff, characterized by
the trial court as a layman unschooled in insurance matters, testified that
he followed the recommendations of the insurance agents and requested
that his coverage included loss to the improvements that he made to the
premises. 82 The insurer chose not to present any evidence, instead relying
on the language of the policies.8 3
The Pennsylvania Superior Court started its analysis in Hionis with the
well-established principle that, because a contract for insurance is viewed
as an adhesion contract between parties of unequal bargaining power, the
policy language is to be construed strictly against the drafter-the in-
surer-when a dispute arises.8 4 The court further held that if an insur-
ance company raises a defense based on an exception or exclusion in a
policy, the burden is on the insurer to establish the defense by showing
77. See id. at 363-64.
78. See id. at 364 (maintaining that plaintiff was limited to recovery for propor-
tionate amount of cost of improvements because improvements were never re-
paired or replaced).
79. See id. (relying on portion (E) (3) (b) of policy to determine coverage).
The policy states:
If not repaired or replaced within a reasonable time after such loss, that
portion of the original cost at the time of installation of the damaged or
destroyed improvements and betterments, which the unexpired term of
the lease at the time of the loss bears to the period(s) from the date(s)
such improvements and betterments were made to the expiration date of
the lease.
Id.
80. See id. (referring to "use interest clause" of section (E) (3) (b) to determine
fair and reasonable value of improvements and betterments).
81. See id. at 365 (stating that plaintiff allowed restaurant patron, agent for
Nationwide, to negotiate coverage with Northern Mutual and plaintiff accepted
new policies for combined coverage of $49,500 with Nationwide and Northern
Mutual).
82. See id. (testifying that plantiff requested that new policy cover him for any
loss to improvements on basis of his considerable expense for such
improvements).
83. See id. (basing defense solely upon terms of insurance policies).
84. See id. (affirming established policy that when dispute arises over policy
prepared by insurer for purchaser with no bargaining power, contract should be
construed against insurer).
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that the insured was not only aware of the exclusion or exception, but also
that the insured understood the exclusion or exception.
85
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Hionis court
found that the insurance company failed to meet its burden of establish-
ing that the insured understood the exclusions contained in the insurance
policies.86 The court's placement of the burden on the insurer was a radi-
cal departure from existing Pennsylvania law and is quite broad in com-
parison to many other versions of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
The general principles discussed in Hionis were reaffirmed and expanded
upon by the Pennsylvania Superior Court later in the same term in Sands
v. Granite Mutual Insurance Co.87 At issue in Sands was the applicability of
an uninsured motorist clause in an automobile insurance policy. The in-
surance company contended that the insured should not be able to re-
cover because the policy specifically contained a clear waiver for
uninsured motorist coverage. 88 The court rejected this argument, how-
ever, relying instead on public policy considerations that indicated a de-
sire to provide coverage for insured motorists who are involved in
accidents with uninsured motorists. 8 9 Although the Sands court did not
specifically cite to Hionis, its conclusions seem to reflect a logic similar to
that employed in Hionis.90 The Sands court acknowledged that a person is
not normally relieved from a contractual obligation due to a failure to
read the plain terms of a contract, but it also noted that contractual terms
cannot thwart the reasonable expectations of the insured:
Courts frequently rely upon public policy in overriding explicit
terms in the insurance contract, at least when the contract terms
would operate to defeat the reasonable expectations of the in-
85. See id. (requiring insurer to establish, even where policy is written in un-
ambiguous terms, that insured was "aware of the exclusion or limitation and that
the effect thereof was explained to him"). In Miller v. Prudential Insurance Co. of
America, 362 A.2d 1017 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), the Pennsylvania Superior Court
discussed some of the factors to be considered in determining whether an insur-
ance consumer understood a policy and its exclusions. See Miller, 362 A.2d at 1020-
21. The court considered the consumer's intent in obtaining the policy in the first
place, the clarity of the written language of the policy and its exclusions, and the
circumstance underlying the actual sale of the policy. See id. (listing factors court
considered in interpreting insurance contract).
86. See Hionis, 327 A.2d at 366 (finding defendants failed to satisfy burden of
proving plaintiffs understanding of, and intention to be bound by, policy terms
because defendant offered no such evidence and because language of exclusion
was in technical and unclear terms).
87. 331 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
88. See Sands, 331 A.2d at 716 (noting defendant insurance company's waiver
argument).
89. See id. at 716-17 (citing Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389
(1968) and analyzing public policy considerations regarding automobile insurance
coverage).
90. Compare Sands, 331 A.2d at 717 (stating that plaintiff expected to be fully
insured so waiver was not valid), with Hionis, 327 A.2d at 366 (stating that plaintiff
was not aware of exclusions and expected to be insured).
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sured, because insurance carriers are affected with a public inter-
est and are in a better position to more equitably divide the risk
of personal tragedy, insofar as such tragedy can be expressed in
dollars and cents.91
The first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed an in-
sured's "reasonable expectations" was in 1977.92 In Rempel v. Nationwide
Life Insurance Co.,93 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a case
where the plaintiff alleged that his reasonable expectation of insurance
coverage was created by the negligent misrepresentations of an insurance
company's agent.9 4 Unlike the majority of cases that discussed the reason-
able expectations doctrine as applied to breach of contract cases, Rempel
was purely a tort case.95 Although it did not cite the superior court's
Hionis and Sands decisions, the Rempel court nonetheless focused on the
reasonable expectations of the insured. 96
In Rempel, the widow of the insured under a mortgage protection life
insurance policy brought an action against the insurer and its agent, con-
tending that the agent had either negligently or fraudulently misrepre-
sented to her husband the extent of coverage under the policy.9 7 The
court noted that the "widow was, in effect, seeking to reform the contract
of insurance to coincide with her husband's reasonable expectations and
beliefs."9 8 A plurality of the court affirmed judgment in favor of the in-
91. Sands, 331 A.2d at 717 (citing W. PAGE KEETON, INSURANCE LAw 22, at§ 341-42 (1971)). In Sands, the court determined that the plaintiff expressed a
desire to be fully insured. See id. (detailing plaintiffs intentions regarding insur-
ance coverage). Yet, it was never explained to the plaintiff that he would need an
additional policy to cover uninsured motorists. See id (expanding on factual cir-
cumstances of case).
92. See Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 366 (Pa. 1977).
93. 370 A.2d 366 (Pa. 1977).
94. See id. at 367 (stating that plaintiff contended that insurance company
fraudulently or negligently misrepresented insurance coverage).
95. See id. (considering claims of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation in
tort context). The Rempel court defined the tort of negligent misrepresentation as
follows:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplied information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to lia-
bility for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and com-
municating the information which its recipient is justified in expecting,
and (b) the harm is suffered (i) by the person or one of the class of
persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and (ii) be-
cause of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was
intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identi-
cal therewith.
Id. at 367-68 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552 (1938)).
96. See id. at 371 (noting that insurance policy did not coincide with what
plaintiffs believed it contained).
97. See id. at 367 (stating that widow contended agent either fraudulently or
negligently misrepresented insurance coverage).
98. Id. at 371.
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sured and against the insurance company.99 In finding that the insured
reasonably relied on the representations of the insurance agent, rather
than reading the policy, the court held that a policy holder had no duty to
read the policy unless there was something on the face of the policy that
would have alerted the insured that the policy did not contain the cover-
age expected as a result of the agent's explanation.1 00 The court ex-
plained that it was "not unreasonable for consumers to rely on the
representations of the expert [insurance agent] rather than on the con-
tents of the insurance policy itself."10 1 Thus, to the extent that the reason-
able expectations of the insured, as to coverage, are caused by the
negligent representations of the agent, those expectations will be satis-
fied-even if they are at variance with the clear and unambiguous lan-
guage of the policy.10 2
It was not until four years after the Pennsylvania Superior Court de-
cided Hionis that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose to address the
reasonable expectations doctrine in a breach of contract case. In Collister
v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 10 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether a conditional receipt created an insur-
ance contract when the insured had made a premium payment prior to
the actual starting date of the insurance policy.1 0 4 The plaintiff and her
husband in Collister applied for a life insurance policy, and the insurance
company, through its agent, accepted a payment from the plaintiff, which
represented a two-month premium payment on the policy. 105 In ex-
change for the payment, the plaintiff was given a "conditional receipt." 10 6
Subsequently, the plaintiffs husband was killed in an automobile accident.
He died before the insurance company's consideration of their applica-
tion, and prior to him taking the medical examinations required under
the terms of the policy.' 0 7 As a result, the insurance company denied lia-
bility, contending that conditions mandatory for coverage had not been
met.10
8
The Collister court first noted that the reasonable expectations of the
insured were the most important consideration in insurance policy dis-
99. See id. at 372 (stating holding of case).
100. See id. at 368-69 (concluding that policyholder has no duty to read policy
unless failure to do so would be unreasonable).
101. Id. at 368.
102. For a further discussion of negligent misrepresentation and an insured's
reasonable expectations, see supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
103. 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
104. See Collister, 388 A.2d at 1348 (discussing whether premium payment and
application created temporary insurance contract).
105. See id. at 1347.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
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putes.10 9 The court cited prior cases in both Pennsylvania and on the
national level that acknowledged the adhesionary nature of insurance pol-
icies. 110 Curiously, neither of the prior superior court opinions in Hionis
and Sands were mentioned by the supreme court. Nevertheless, the court
relied heavily on authority in other jurisdictions, which concluded that if
the language of an insurance contract gives rise to an intention on the
part of the insurer to provide interim coverage in exchange for a condi-
tional receipt, such coverage must be provided.' 1 ' The court further es-
tablished that in situations where the surrounding circumstances did not
give rise to an inference that the insurer intended to provide interim cov-
erage in exchange for payment, the burden was still on the insurer to es-
tablish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the insurance consumer
had no reasonable basis for believing that he or she was receiving immedi-
ate coverage. 112
The Pennsylvania's Supreme Court's discussion in Collister, however,
did not end with simply establishing this burden. Instead, the court took
its analysis a step further by indicating that when a person pays an insur-
ance premium, he or she has a right to expect something of value in re-
turn, regardless of the clear language of the policy. 1 3 The court noted
that the insurance industry often uses complex and difficult language in
insurance contracts, forcing consumers to rely on the verbal assurances of
the insurance agent.' 14 Such situations, the court concluded, almost auto-
matically give rise to misunderstanding on the part of the insurance con-
sumer. 115 Therefore, the reasonable expectations of the insured must be
the controlling principle, "regardless of the ambiguity, or lack thereof, in-
herent in a given set of insurance documents." 116 The broad policy state-
ments made by the supreme court in Collister started Pennsylvania on a
series of opinions that applied the reasonable expectations doctrine in-
consistently and caused a great deal of confusion in the jurisdiction.' 17
109. See id. at 1351 (stating that reasonable expectations of insured should be
examined when normal contract principles no longer apply).
110. See id. at 1348-53.
111. See id. at 1353 (stating that when "the language of the application and
conditional receipt ... indicate[ ] an intent ... of the insurer to provide interim
insurance, then such benefits will be awarded").
112. See id. (noting that burden remains with insurer).
113. See id. (stating that public has "right to expect something of comparable
value in return for the premium paid").
114. See id. (detailing misleading parts of insurance contracts).
115. See id. (stating that misunderstanding results when representations do
not accurately reflect terms of contract).
116. Id.
117. See id. (explaining that court generated confusion when it appeared to
apply reasonable expectations doctrine to conditional receipt context, but then
reiterated its position that insured had no duty to read policy). Indeed, one
scholar has written that the decision in Collister is largely responsible for the consid-
erable confusion over the state of the reasonable expectations doctrine in Penn-
sylvania. See Henderson, supra note 46, at 829.
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Illustrative of the confusion was the Pennsylvania Superior Court's de-
cision in Pruser v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 118 decided nearly three
years after Collister. In that case, the superior court was asked to interpret
the scope of coverage provided by the provisions of a "tenants" policy,
which covered personal property. 1 9 The insured, citing Collister, argued
that the policy must be construed "by reference to the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured." 120 The superior court rejected this argument, find-
ing that reliance upon Collister was misplaced because the reasonable
expectations doctrine was limited to the issue of whether an insurance
contract existed, not to the scope of its coverage. 121 Approximately one
year prior to Pruser, however, Judge Keeton characterized Collister as being
in line with decisions from at least ten other states that adopted the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine as applying to the scope of coverage, as well
as to the issue of whether there was an insurance contract in the first
instance. 12 2
In 1983, only five years after the decision in Collister, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court took a completely opposite position, or at the very least,
significantly retreated from the prior position taken in Collister. In Stan-
dard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co.,' 23 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court applied traditional contract principles in concluding that
when the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, a
court must give effect to that language. 124 At issue in Standard Venetian
Blind were certain exclusions contained in an insurance policy issued by
American Empire Insurance ("American") to the plaintiff, Standard Vene-
tian Blind ("Venetian Blind"). 12 5 Plaintiff was a contractor, but had sub-
contracted the job that gave rise to the lawsuit, which Venetian Blind
expected American to defend on its behalf.126 American agreed to de-
fend Venetian Blind on various claims against it, but refused to defend on
118. 428 A.2d 604 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
119. See Pruser, 428 A.2d at 604-05 (stating issue presented).
120. Id. at 606.
121. See id. (distinguishing issue in Collister from issue in Pruser); see also Bierer
v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 461 A.2d 216, 220-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (applying rea-
sonable expectations doctrine to determine starting date of an insurance policy);
Gdovic v. Catholic Knights of St. George, 453 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (same).
122. See Davenport Peters Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 286, 291 &
n.5 (D. Mass. 1980) (Keeton, J.) (listing cases that adhere to reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine).
123. 469 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1983).
124. See Standard Venetian Blind, 469 A.2d at 567 (noting that failure to read or
understand clear and conspicuous policy limitation is not valid defense). The
court suggested that "to allow Venetian to avoid application of the clear and unam-
biguous policy limitations in these circumstances would require us to rewrite the
parties' written contract." Id. at 566.
125. See id. at 565.
126. See id. (quoting exclusions in contract).
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the claims of damage caused by Venetian Blind's products themselves.' 27
Both American and Venetian Blind agreed that the exclusions were clear
and unambiguous. However, Venetian Blind, relying on the superior
court's decision in Hionis, argued that the exclusions should be unenforce-
able because the insured had never been made aware of, nor had Ameri-
can explained to it, the meaning of the exclusions.1 2 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court strictly construed the insurance
contract.129 The court rejected the superior court's decision in Hionis,
stating that "the burden imposed by Hionis fails to accord proper signifi-
cance to the written contract, which has historically been the true test of
parties' intentions."' 30 It explained that reliance on the Hionis standard
left too much discretion to the factfinder to evaluate the credibility of the
parties involved.1 31 The court was adamant in its position that the insured
should not be able to avoid the application of clear and unambiguous
terms in an insurance policy.' 32 The court acknowledged, however, the
"manifest inequality of bargaining power" between insurance companies
and purchasers of insurance 133 and noted that on occasion it may be ap-
propriate for a court to "deviat[e] from the plain language" of an uncon-
scionable contract.' 3 4 The supreme court then restated its holding that
the insured may not avoid the exclusions contained in a policy for failure
to read or understand when the exclusion is "clearly worded and conspicu-
ously displayed."' 3 5 What is puzzling about this decision is that the su-
preme court made no mention of its prior decision in Collister, leaving
lower courts uncertain as to how to proceed in similar cases.1 36 Indeed, in
127. See id.
128. See id. at 566 (noting that Venetian Blind was not aware of exclusions).
129. See id. at 565-67 (holding that when "policy limitation relied upon by the
insurer to deny coverage is clearly worded and conspicuously displayed, the in-
sured may not avoid the consequences of the limitation").
130. Id. at 567.
131. See id.
132. See id. (stating that insured cannot avoid consequences of failing to read
or to understand limitations).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (1999) concerning unconscionable
contracts).
135. Id. Despite the emphatic rejection of Hionis by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, one panel of judges of the superior court has stated in an opinion
decided in 1987, that "Hionis has not been overruled. The [Pennsylvania] Su-
preme Court simply rejected its application on the record presented in Standard
Venetian Blind while indicating its continuing potential applicability under a differ-
ent fact pattern." State Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 528 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987). Nonetheless, there has been no other case since Standard Vene-
tian Blind where the superior court relied upon its Hionis opinion as precedent.
Indeed, in a prior decision, the superior court explicitly acknowledged that Hionis
was overruled by the supreme court. See Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088,
1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that Hionis is not followed).
136. See Joseph G. Lisicky, Note, Failure of Insurance Agency to Promptly Issue
Details of Coverage Releases Insured from Obligation to Pay Premiums-Mears, Inc. v.
National Basic Sensors, Inc., 60 TEMP. L.Q. 481, 497 n.148 (1987) (citing cases
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the next decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to address an insur-
ance coverage issue, Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufac-
turers' Ass'n,137 the court relied exclusively on Standard Venetian Blind,
again did not mention Collister, and upheld a clear and unambiguous pol-
icy exclusion.
In 1987, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally attempted to clarify
the debate over reasonable expectations in Tonkovic v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 13 8 In Tonkovic, the plaintiff applied for disability
insurance coverage under the assumption that he would receive a policy
that would cover him regardless of whether or not the injury incurred
would make the insured eligible for worker's compensation benefits. 139
The insurance consumer never received a written copy of the policy, and it
was later revealed that the insurance company had unilaterally changed
the terms of coverage under the policy.
140
acknowledging confusion over correct application of law). One scholar has at-
tempted to reconcile the opinion in Standard Venetian Blind with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's earlier opinion by suggesting that Standard Venetian Blind signifi-
cantly narrowed Collister. See Henderson, supra note 46, at 830 (claiming that Stan-
dard Venetian Blind narrowed Collister). Professor Henderson argued that the
supreme court opinions were consistent in that they both endorsed the approach
that a court would be justified in deviating from the policy language only where
the contract was made under unconscionable circumstances. See id. (discussing
cases separately).
For further evidence of the contradictory and confusing state of the law at this
time in Pennsylvania, see Mears, Inc. v. National Basic Sensors, Inc., 507 A.2d 32 (Pa.
1986). In Mears, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity to explain
its decisions in Collister and Standard Venetian Blind. See id. at 37 (citing Collister for
proposition that where there is no insurance policy, unclear, written words will be
"construed liberally in favor of the insured"). In Mears, the insured requested in-
creased coverage for a property. See id. at 36 (noting that Mears requested Na-
tional increase its coverage from $160,000 to $190,000). When the insurance
company did not issue documents reflecting the increased coverage on the correct
property within a reasonable time, the insured refused to pay the premiums due.
See id. (noting that National cancelled its policy and refused to pay increased and
changed coverage). After a trial, a jury found that the insured was not liable for
premiums. See id. at 36 (noting jury decision). The supreme court affirmed, hold-
ing that in a contract for insurance, there exists a constructive condition that the
insurer must assure the insured of specific and particular coverage within a reason-
able time. See id. at 38 (holding that "explicit, particular" assurances are required).
Failure to provide such assurance essentially constitutes a breach of the insurance
contract and relieves the insured from the duty to pay premiums. See id. at 38 n.5
(stating that failure to assure constitutes "substantial breach"). In upholding the
verdict, the supreme court did not apply either the expectations approach or the
traditional contract approach. In fact, it did not include any reference to either
Collister or Standard Venetian Blind, the leading cases in this area of insurance law.
137. 517 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1986).
138. 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987).
139. See Tonkovic, 521 A.2d at 921 (noting that plaintiff applied for such insur-
ance in order to make mortgage payments).
140. See id. at 922.
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Based on the facts of the case, the Tonkovic court distinguished Stan-
dard Venetian Blind.'4 ' It interpreted Standard Venetian Blind to stand for
the proposition that the plain terms of a policy will be enforced when the
insured received the coverage bargained for, but failed to read the terms
of the policy.' 42 The supreme court explained that "here [appellant] spe-
cifically requested a type of coverage that would have protected him in this
instance, but was issued a policy quite different from that which he re-
quested." 14 3 The court relied on the qualifying language contained in
Standard Venetian Blind in rejecting the insurance company's contention
that the court should rely on that case. 144 The court found further sup-
port for its decision in Collister. In fact, the Tonkovic court included exten-
sive language from Collister, suggesting a desire to re-establish the
reasonable expectations of the insured as the controlling standard. 1 45 In
addition, the supreme court also relied on Rempel v. Nationwide Life Insur-
ance Co.1 4 6 Although Rempel was a negligent misrepresentation case, the
Tonkovic court found it to be "clearly controlling on the instant facts."147
After analyzing these cases, the court stated the following:
We find a crucial distinction between cases where one applies for
a specific type of coverage and the insurer unilaterally limits that
coverage, resulting in a policy quite different from what the in-
sured requested, and cases where the insured received precisely
the coverage that he requested but failed to read the policy to
discover clauses that are the usual incident of the coverage ap-
plied for. When the insurer elects to issue a policy differing from
what the insured requested and paid for, there is clearly a duty to
advise the insured of the changes so made. The burden is not on
the insured to read the policy to discover such changes, or not
read it at his peril. 148
From the above passage, it is clear that the court left its holding intact
in Standard Venetian Blind, but changed the standard to be applied when
141. See id, at 923-24 (noting that appellant in this case never received a policy
that was changed).
142. See id. at 924.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 924-25.
145. See id. at 925-26 (relying on Collisterto support using reasonable expecta-
tions of insured). The court noted that Collister established that "[t]he reasonable
expectation of the insured is the focal point of the insurance transaction involved
here." Id. at 926 (quoting Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353
(Pa. 1978) (citing Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 532, 537 (Pa. 1967))). The
court concluded by stating that "[c] ourts must examine the dynamics of the insur-
ance transaction to ascertain what are the reasonable expectations of the con-
sumer." Id. (quoting Collister, 388 A.2d at 1354 (citing Rempel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
370 A.2d 366 (Pa. 1977))).
146. 370 A.2d 366 (Pa. 1977).
147. Tonkovic, 521 A.2d at 925.
148. Id.
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insurance companies take unilateral action to change the extent of cover-
age. 149 One scholar has characterized this standard as a limited applica-
tion of the reasonable expectations doctrine, suggesting that "one could
argue that the Pennsylvania decisions, at most, adopt a rather narrow
application of the doctrine, one that provides relief only where in the ap-
plication process the insured gets less than what was specifically prom-
ised."150 Nonetheless, it is clear that, as Justice Flaherty noted in his
dissenting opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revitalized the appli-
cation of the reasonable expectations doctrine in some form in its deci-
sion in Tonkovic.15 1
Justice Flaherty criticized the Tonkovic majority for not following Stan-
dard Venetian Blind and promulgating "a new Hionis-like rule," holding
"that an insured does not even have to read the policy. 1 52 The Justice
criticized the "reasonable expectations" doctrine as applied in Hionis, by
warning that "if writings do not memorialize the agreement of the parties,
then all contract disputes, insurance and otherwise, would be reduced to
conflicting remembrances and assertions of the parties."1 53 Justice Zap-
pala also dissented, criticizing the majority for relying heavily on Rempel,
which was not a breach of contract case, but a tort case. 154
Tonkovic presented the superior court with an opportunity to resur-
rect the dormant reasonable expectations doctrine. In State Automobile In-
surance Ass'n v. Anderson,' 55 the insurer filed an action against an insured
seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify under a
farmer's comprehensive personal injury policy.' 56 The policy in question
required the insurer to pay all sums that the insured became legally obli-
gated to pay, for personal injury or property damage occurring and result-
ing from the operation of the farm. 157 This coverage, however, did not
apply to any "farm employee" if the bodily injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment of the injured.158 The injured party was a
friend of the insured's son and had come to the farm to assist in loading
149. See Henderson, supra note 46, at 829-31 (discussing progression of Collis-
ter, Standard Venetian Blind and Tonkovic).
150. Id. at 831.
151. See Tonkovic, 521 A.2d at 927 (discussing how majority holding ignored
Standard Venetian Blind).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 928-29 (discussing differences between Remple and instant case).
See generally Stewart L. Cohen, Resolving Insurance Coverage Disputes in Pennsylvania
Through Principles of Tort Law-A Bridge Over Muddied Waters, 60 PA. B. Ass'n Q. 201
(1989) (discussing use of tort law to resolve insurance coverage disputes in
Pennsylvania).
155. 528 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
156. See Anderson, 528 A.2d at 1375.
157. See id. 1375-76.
158. See id. at 1375.
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cut hay and corn into a silo. 159 Although usually paid for this work, the
injured party did not get paid periodically, and he only sporadically as-
sisted the insured with the chores on the farm. 160
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer,
finding that the injured person was a "farm employee" and thus excluded
from coverage. 161 Relying upon Tonkovic and Collister, the superior court
reversed and held that the record established that the insured had a rea-
sonable expectation of coverage under the circumstances. 162 Specifically,
the court found that the insured's expectation of coverage was influenced
by his discussions with the agent who sold the policy. 1 63 Furthermore,
though the court found the policy exclusion "clear and unambiguous"
upon its face, the court found that the term "employee" was not defined in
the policy and was therefore ambiguous.' 64 Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.1 65
Since the Tonkovic decision in 1987, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
has rendered other decisions addressing the reasonable expectations doc-
trine. These decisions are too numerous to discuss on an individual basis.
They all interpret the pronouncements of the state's highest court and
reflect the current state of the reasonable expectations doctrine in Penn-
sylvania. 16 6 They can, however, be summarized.
First, Pennsylvania courts will continue to follow Standard Venetian
Blind and enforce the clear and unambiguous language of an insurance
contract even though the insured's reasonable expectations are frustrated
by this strict approach. 16 7 As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has repeat-
159. See id. ("Lentz had come to appellant's farm that morning to assist in the
loading of 'silage,' cut hay and corn for cattle feed, into a silo.").
160. See id. at 1377-78 (noting no common understanding between insured
and injured parties on issue of compensation).
161. See id. at 1375.
162. See id. at 1379 (holding that "coverage of this occurrence should focus on
the reasonable expectation of the insured and not on the subjective intent of the
insurer").
163. See id. (stating that agent's discussion with appellant "influenced appel-
lant's expectations as to his coverage under the policy in question").
164. See id. at 1377.
165. See id. at 1379 (vacating summary judgment order, remanding for further
proceedings and relinquishing jurisdiction).
166. For a further discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see
supra notes 15-72 and accompanying text. A federal court applying Pennsylvania
law must give proper regard, but not conclusive effect, to the decisions of the supe-
rior court. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wyman, 718 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1983) ("If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet passed on the question
before us, we must consider the pronouncements of lower state courts. Such deci-
sions should be given proper regard, but not conclusive effect."). "When ascertain-
ing matters of state law, only the decisions of the state's highest court constitute
the authoritative source." Id.
167. See, e.g., Bubis v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 718 A.2d 1270, 1273
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting party's failure to read is not excuse if language was
clear); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 676 A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (stating that unambiguous policy language "dictates this result"); Britamco
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edly stated: "While reasonable expectations of the insured are the focal
points in interpreting the contract language of insurance policies, an in-
sured may not complain that his or her reasonable expectations were frus-
trated by policy limitations which are clear and unambiguous."1 68 The
superior court has reasoned that enforcing clear and unambiguous policy
language, regardless of whether the insured actually read and understood
it, "avoids uncertain results, expedites the resolution of coverage disputes
and reduces the costs of obtaining insurance." 169
Second, Pennsylvania courts will construe ambiguous language in a
policy in favor of the insured. 170 As the Pennsylvania Superior Court
stated: "Where a provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy is to be
construed in favor of the insured, who typically lacks bargaining leverage
regarding the terms of the coverage, and against the insurer, the drafter of
the agreement."1 7 1
Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d 1208, 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (not-
ing that provision "clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage").
168. Bubis, 718 A.2d at 1272 (quoting Frain v. Keystone Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1352,
1355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)); see Insurance Co. v. Hampton, 657 A.2d 976, 978 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that insured cannot complain that his or her reasonable
expectations were frustrated by policy limitations that are "clear and unambigu-
ous"); Scott v. Southwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 647 A.2d 587, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994) (same); Frain, 640 A.2d at 1354 (same); Britamco, 639 A.2d at 1210 (same);
Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Weiner, 636 A.2d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
(same); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 630 A.2d 28, 30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(en banc) (same); Neil v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1304, 1309 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (same).
169. Koval v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 487, 489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987);
accord Schneider v. Lindenmuth-Cline Agency, Inc., 620 A.2d 505, 509-10 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (distinguishing facts of case from facts of Tonkovic); Banker v.
Valley Forge Ins. Co., 526 A.2d 434, 436-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (quoting Tonkovic
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920, 923-25 (Pa. 1987). In JH. France
Reftactories Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated:
Any reasonable expectation which would be imputed to the parties by
this or any court must necessarily rely upon, and be reasonably consistent
with, the written document and phraseology, simply because any inter-
pretation advanced contrary to the contents of the written document
could hardly be viewed as "reasonable" to assert; unless good reason in
law is advanced for the disregarding of the clearly contrary phraseology.
578 A.2d 468, 472 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), revd in part and affd in part, 626 A.2d 502
(Pa. 1993).
170. See, e.g., Bateman v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1991)
(stating that where policy is unambiguous it should be interpreted in favor of in-
sured); Bubis, 718 A.2d at 1272 (same); Frain, 640 A.2d at 355 (same).
171. Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 144 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (finding pollution exclusion ambiguous and construing it against
insurer). The superior court refused to apply the reasonable expectations doc-
trine, noting that the doctrine "does not command a majority of our supreme
court." Id. at 144 n.1. This refusal to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine
appears to be contrary to the supreme court's holding in Collister that the reasona-
ble expectations of the insured must be the controlling principle "regardless of the
ambiguity, or lack thereof, inherent in a given set of insurance documents." Collis-
ter v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Pa. 1978); see Gilderman v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 941, 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ("In construing a
25
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Third, the reasonable expectations of an insured will be honored and
coverage will be found by Pennsylvania courts when an insurer accepts
payment of a premium at the time the insurer takes the application and
the insurer fails to establish that the consumer has no reasonable basis for
believing he or she was purchasing insurance coverage. 172 This principle
was announced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Collister and contin-
ues to be applied to issues of coverage during the interim period between
application and issuance of the policy.
173
Fourth, the reasonable expectations of the insured will be honored
despite the clearest written exclusion if: (1) as in Tonkovic, "the insured
applied for a specific type of coverage or benefit and the insurer issued a
policy materially different from the requested type"; 174 or (2) as in Rempel
the insurer or its agent misrepresented the terms of coverage and the in-
sured justifiably relied upon those assurances; 175 or (3) the insurance
company failed to fulfill a duty to the insured and that failure caused the
company to deny coverage.
176
The only decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after Tonkovic
to mention the reasonable expectations doctrine was Madison Construction
Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., 1 7 7 decided on July 27, 1999. In
policy, coverage provisions are interpreted to afford the greatest possible protec-
tion to the insured, and the insured's expectations are our focus."); Huffman v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 486 A.2d 1330, 1335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding policy
provision ambiguous and remanding for trial court to ascertain reasonable expec-
tations of insured).
172. See, e.g., Dibble v. Security of Am. Life Ins., 590 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (holding life insurance effective upon first payment); Collister, 388 A.2d
at 1354 (holding that insurer failed to establish that appellant could not have ex-
pectation that insured was covered at time of first payments).
173. See Dibble, 590 A.2d at 356 (holding that insureds could have reasonably
believed policy became effective when they paid first premium with application
and that insurer did not unequivocally show that insureds were not receiving im-
mediate benefits in return for their premium payment). But see Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 676 A.2d 680, 683-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (coverage did not
become effective on date of insured's application and payment of premium to
person who was not licensed agent or producer, but only when application was
sent by licensed agent who filled in effective date of coverage on application as
date and time of mailing).
174. Koval, 531 A.2d at 490.
175. See State Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 528 A.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1987) (quoting Collister, 388 A.2d at 1353-54).
176. See Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krawitz, 633 A.2d 215, 217 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize condition precedent to payment of insurance pol-
icy, which only insurance company could fulfill, when insurer refused to fulfill
obligation and denial of coverage would "utterly destroy any reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured").
177. 735 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1999). There were two other decisions by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court after Tonkovic that addressed insurance coverage issues,
but neither case discussed the reasonable expectations doctrine. In Bateman v.
Motorist Mutual Insurance Co., the supreme court found a clause in an automobile
policy ambiguous, but before doing so emphasized the rule of Standard Venetian
Blind that, in interpreting a contract of insurance, the courts must ascertain "the
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Madison Construction, the supreme court was called upon to interpret a
pollution exclusion clause in a comprehensive general liability policy.' 78
In ruling against the insured, and in favor of the insurance company, the
state's highest court began its analysis by stating the court's "only aim" in
interpreting an insurance contract is "to ascertain the intent of the parties
as manifested by the language of the written instrument."179 The court
reiterated what it stated in Standard Venetian Blind: "Where a provision of a
policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement. Where,
however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is
required to give effect to that language." 180 The court refused to consider
the insured's argument "that the reasonable expectations of the insured
must be considered, regardless of the express terms of the policy," because
the issue was not fully briefed by the insured. 18 1 Nonetheless, the court,
in dicta, questioned the merit of this argument, noting that accepting this
contention "would entail a substantial expansion of the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine, heretofore applied in very limited circumstances." 182
The court noted that in the two cases where the court applied the doc-
trine, it was "to protect [a] non-commercial insured" either from "policy
terms not readily apparent," as in Collister, or "from deception," as in
Tonkovic.183 The court thus intimated that the doctrine may not apply to a
commercial insured, such as a corporation. The statement that the doc-
trine would only apply when the policy terms are "not readily apparent"
harks back to Professor Keeton's requirement that the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured be honored "even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations." 184 The court's
comment that the doctrine would apply when there is deception recog-
nizes that policy language will not be enforced when the insured affirma-
intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument." 590
A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1991). Likewise, in Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. v. Haver, 725
A.2d 743 (Pa. 1999), the supreme court did not discuss the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine, but instead cited to Standard Venetian Blind when upholding an ex-
clusion in an insurance policy. See Haver, 725 A.2d at 746 (stating that context in
which term "malpractice" was used indicated parties did not intend for such con-
duct to be covered).
178. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106
(Pa. 1999) (stating that "no appellate court of this Commonwealth has considered
whether the exclusion precludes coverage for an injury arising from exposure to
the fumes of a useful product").
179. Id. at 108 (quoting Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n
Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 1986)).
180. Id. at 106 (quoting Gene & Harvey Builders, 517 A.2d at 913).
181. Id. at 109 n.8.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Keeton, supra note 8, at 967.
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tively creates a contrary expectation of coverage through fraud or
negligent misrepresentation. 185
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S PERSPECTIVE
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first ad-
dressed Pennsylvania's reasonable expectations doctrine in 1975.186 Ini-
tially, the court of appeals grappled with the now-rejected Hionis doctrine.
In DaBurlos v. Commercial Insurance Co., a8 7 decided in 1975, the Third Cir-
cuit applied the Hionis case to find that an exclusion in an airline trip
policy was unenforceable because the insurer did not prove that the in-
sureds were aware of the exclusion.18 8 In Treasure Craft Jewelers, Inc. v. Jef-
ferson Insurance Co., 18 9 decided in 1978, the Third Circuit distinguished
Hionis and found no coverage for loss of jewelry pursuant to a policy is-
sued to a jewelry store. 190 The court found that the undisputed facts
demonstrated that the insured must have known of the limitation of the
policy.191
In a third case, the Third Circuit declined to apply the reasonable
expectations standard that existed at the time. In Brokers Title Co. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 1 92 decided in 1979, the court addressed
the question of whether a professional tide insurance broker may avoid
the consequence of an otherwise unambiguous clause in an insurance pol-
icy on the basis that the broker misunderstood the clause. 193 In the
course of the insurance transaction, the insurance salesperson read the
exclusions of the policy to the title broker, who was the insurance cus-
tomer. 194 The tide broker did not ask any questions about the policy after
it was read to him.195 At trial, the district court applied the rule in Hionis
and held that the particular policy exclusion did not apply because it was
never explained to the consumer, nor did the consumer understand the
effect of the exclusion. 196
185. See Madison Construction, 735 A.2d at 109-10 (recognizing detrimental ef-
fect of fraud or negligent misrepresentation).
186. See DaBurlos v. Commercial Ins. Co., 521 F.2d 18, 30 (3d Cir. 1975) (stat-
ing that Pennsylvania law provides that insured's burden of proof includes demon-
strating that exclusionary clause is applicable to circumstances of case and that
insured was aware of provision relating to non-coverage).
187. 521 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1975).
188. See id. at 28 (holding coverage must be extended because defendants
failed to meet burden of proof).
189. 583 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1978).
190. See Treasure Craft Jewelers, 583 F.2d at 654 (stating that situation in Treasure
Craft is closely related to Miller v. Prudential Ins. Co., 363 A.2d 1017 (1976)).
191. See id. (stating that all factors indicate court in Treasure Craft was aware of
policy's limitation as to coverage).
192. 610 F.2d 1174 (3d Cir. 1979).
193. See Brokers Title, 610 F.2d at 1176 (describing issue facing court).
194. See id. at 1177.
195. See id.
196. See id. (stating procedural history).
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The Third Circuit initially distinguished the "insurance consumer" in
this case, a title broker, from the typical lay consumer with no knowledge
or understanding of the terminology used in the insurance field.1 97 The
court accepted the argument that the purchaser in this case was proficient
in insurance matters. 19 8 As a result, the court dismissed the underlying
reasoning of Hionis as applied to this case because there was no apparent
or actual unequal bargaining power or contract of adhesion. 199 Once the
court dismissed any "adhesionary" arguments, it proceeded to interpret
the contract under a "freedom of contract" analysis and determined that
the clear written language of the policy should be enforced. 20 0
In Blair v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 2 0 1 decided in 1982, the Third
Circuit applied the Collister decision and upheld a verdict for the insurance
company, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
finding that an applicant for insurance did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion that he had obtained temporary or interim coverage under a policy
between the time that the application was submitted and the time it was
denied.20 2 In Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Bruno,20 3 decided in 1983, the
issue was whether a homeowner's insurance policy covered an intentional
criminal act. 20 4 The Third Circuit explained that the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine developed in Hionis and Collister applied only to objectively
reasonable expectations and not unreasonable expectations. 20 5 The court
also explained that "it is unreasonable as a matter of law for an insured to
expect that a homeowner's insurance policy will provide liability coverage
for intentional such criminal acts .... -206 The court, therefore, enforced
the policy language excluding coverage for intentional acts. 20 7
The Third Circuit had another opportunity to address this issue in
1990.208 By this time, however, the law in Pennsylvania had gone through
significant change with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 1177-80 (finding testimony of plaintiffs regarding own insur-
ance experience persuasive in reaching decision).
200. See id. at 1180-81 (interpreting contract under freedom of contract
analysis).
201. 692 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1982).
202. See Blair, 692 F.2d at 300 (holding that evidence was sufficient to support
finding that insurance applicant did not have reasonable expectation that he had
obtained temporary or interim coverage under policy).
203. 718 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1983).
204. See Bruno, 718 F.2d at 70 (stating issue).
205. See id. at 71 (reviewing applications of Hionis and Collister).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 70 (enforcing policy language excluding coverage for inten-
tional acts).
208. See McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 922 F.2d 1073 (3d
Cir. 1990).
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Standard Venetian Blind.2 09 In McMillan v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of
America,2 10 the Third Circuit was called upon to construe the phrase "on
authorized business" in a group life insurance policy. 211 Dawn McMillan,
a Trans World Airlines employee, was killed by her estranged husband
after her shift ended and she exited the building where she worked. 212
The question was whether the victim was "on authorized business" when
she was killed. 213 Without mentioning an insured's "reasonable expecta-
tions," the court adhered to a strict "ambiguity" analysis and determined
that there were numerous interpretations of the controverted phrase, re-
sulting in a construction most favorable to the insured. 214
A more significant decision came a short time later, when the Third
Circuit was called upon to interpret a stacking provision in an automobile
insurance policy. In West American Insurance Co. v. Park,2 15 the plaintiff,
while operating her husband's automobile, had an accident with an unin-
sured motorist.2 16 The automobile driven by the plaintiff was covered by a
policy that limited coverage for liability to third parties at $100,000.217
The policy contained an additional provision which granted uninsured/
underinsured coverage of $100,000 for each vehicle covered under the
policy, which in this case covered two vehicles. 218 After the accident, the
insured filed a claim in which she "stacked" the uninsured motorist cover-
age for each vehicle covered by the policy, totaling $200,000.219 This
claim was contested by the insurance company because a Pennsylvania stat-
utory provision limited the amount of uninsured motorist coverage that
209. See Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d
563 (Pa. 1983).
210. 922 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1990).
211. See McMillan, 922 F.2d 1074 (noting that policy is silent on meaning of
phrase).
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1075-77 (stating that "any reasonable interpretation offered by
the insured ... must control" when insurance policies include ambiguous terms).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously inter-
preted Pennsylvania law as requiring any ambiguities to be construed in favor of
the insured. See Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 1987)
(stating that insured receives favorable interpretation of ambiguous policy even
when both insured and insurer offer reasonable explanations to court); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985)
(requiring strict construction of ambiguities against insurer); Houghton v. Ameri-
can Guar. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating ambiguous terms
must be interpreted in favor of insurer because of superior bargaining power of
insurance companies).
215. 933 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1991).
216. See West Am, 933 F.2d at 1236.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 1237-38.
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could be covered at the general policy limit of liability specified in the
bodily injury section of the policy.220
At the outset of the court's discussion, the Third Circuit acknowl-
edged the equitable principles underlying Pennsylvania insurance law.22 1
The court, however, greatly expanded the scope of Pennsylvania law in its
analysis. The court suggested the following:
Collister and subsequent insurance cases expand traditional no-
tions of equitable estoppel so that the insurer is bound not only
by the expectations that it creates, but also by any other reasona-
ble expectation of the insured. The insured's reasonable expec-
tations control, even if they are contrary to the explicit terms of
the policy.22 2
The Third Circuit cited State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Williams,22 3 a 1978 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, to sup-
port the above statement. 224 That decision, however, never mentioned
the reasonable expectations doctrine. Indeed, this broad statement was
and is contrary to the law in Pennsylvania.2 25 Since the decision in Stan-
dard Venetian Blind, Pennsylvania courts have never suggested that the rea-
sonable expectations of the insured always control-instead, they have
held that the reasonable expectations will control only when they conflict
with ambiguous policy language or in unique circumstances, such as when
the insurance consumer is misled as to the meaning of a policy.226 In fact,
ever since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled Hionis in Standard
Venetian Blind, the Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly stated that " [w] hile
reasonable expectations of the insured are the focal points in interpreting
the contract language of insurance policies, an insured may not complain
220. See id. at 1238 (citing 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1736 (West Supp.
1990)). The statute states that "[t]he coverages provided under this subchapter
may be offered by insurers in amounts higher than those required by this chapter
but may not be greater than the limits of liability specified in the bodily injury
liability provisions of the insured's policy." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1736 (West
Supp. 1990).
221. See West Am., 933 F.2d at 1239 ("Pennsylvania insurance law incorporates
principles of equitable estoppel.").
222. See id., 933 F.2d at 1239 (citations omitted).
223. 392 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1978).
224. See West Am., 933 F.2d at 1239 (citing Williams, 392 A.2d at 286-87). In
Williams, the supreme court refused to enforce an exclusion that limited the in-
surer's liability under an uninsured motorist provision of an automobile policy. See
id. at 287 (holding that exclusion conflicted with Pennsylvania's Uninsured Motor-
ist Act, as previously interpreted by state's highest court).
225. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania law regarding the reasonable
expectations doctrine, see supra notes 186-214 and accompanying text.
226. See Bateman v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 282, 283 (Pa. 1991)
(stating that when policy is ambiguous, it is construed in favor of insured); see also
Neil v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1304, 1311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting appel-
lants' expectations were insufficient for court to invalidate exclusionary clause).
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that his or her reasonable expectations were frustrated by policy limita-
tions which are clear and unambiguous." 22 7
In West American, the Third Circuit, although making an overly-broad
pronouncement on the reasonable expectations principle, applied the
reasonable expectations principle in that case only as an equitable estop-
pel doctrine. 228 Noting that Pennsylvania insurance law incorporates
principles of equitable estoppel, the court defined equitable estoppel as
follows: "Reduced to its essence, equitable estoppel is a doctrine of funda-
mental fairness intended to preclude a party from depriving another of a
reasonable expectation, when the party inducing the expectation knew or
should have known that the other would rely to his detriment upon that
conduct."229 The court held that because the insurance policy issued to
the insured created a reasonable expectation that uninsured motorist cov-
erages would be stacked, and the insured relied on those representations
to his detriment, the insurer would be equitably estopped from denying
benefits, even though full stacking of the amounts of benefits would vio-
late Pennsylvania's motor vehicle law. 230
In the three years after West American, the Third Circuit barely men-
tioned the reasonable expectations doctrine in the several opinions it filed
addressing insurance coverage issues.23 1 In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. Lewis,23 2 decided in 1991, the Third Circuit construed the term "liv-
ing with" in an umbrella policy providing coverage to a family member
living with the insured. 233 Without discussing the reasonable expectations
doctrine, the court found the term "living with" was unambiguous, and
therefore, according to Pennsylvania law, the term was to be given its
"plain and ordinary meaning."234 The court held that for a person to be
considered "living with" the insured, that person must "maintain regular
personal contacts with the insured's home."23 5 Then, in Langer v. Monarch
227. Bubis v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 718 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (citations omitted). For a further discussion of cases supporting
the proposition that clear and unambiguous language will control over an in-
sured's reasonable expectations, see supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
228. SeeWest Am. Ins. Co. v. Park, 933 F.2d 1236, 1239 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting
Pennsylvania insurance law incorporates principles of equitable estoppel).
229. Id. (quoting Straup v. Times Herald, 423 A.2d 713, 720 (Pa. 1980)).
230. See id. at 1239.
231. For a discussion of Third Circuit cases involving insurance coverage, see
infra notes 232-45 and accompanying text.
232. 935 F.2d 1428 (3d Cir. 1991).
233. See St. Paul Fire & Marine, 935 F.2d at 1431-33 (interpreting policy
provisions).
234. See id. at 1431 (citing Pennsylvania Mfts. Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 548, 551 (Pa. 1967)).
235. Id. at 1433 (interpreting "living with"). For a more recent example
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has denied cover-
age pursuant to unambiguous policy language and gave no consideration to Penn-
sylvania's reasonable expectations doctrine, see Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Co., 65 F.3d 1097 (3d Cir. 1995).
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Life Insurance Co.,23 6 decided in 1992, the Third Circuit considered the
question of whether an insurer's acceptance of an application form and
first premium payment for a disability policy created a temporary insur-
ance contract. 23 7 Applying the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in
Collister, the Third Circuit held that the subjective expectations of the in-
sured as to coverage "do not control"; rather, a factfinder must consider
"what a reasonable person in [the insured's] shoes would have ex-
pected."238 The court held that the question of whether the insured's be-
lief was reasonable was one for the jury, and the district court erred in not
submitting the question to the jury.239
In Worldwide Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brady,240 also decided in
1992, the Third Circuit held that the language of a family limitation exclu-
sion in an automobile policy was unclear and thus had to be construed
against the insurer and in favor of the insured as required by Standard
Venetian Blind.24 1 Although the court of appeals affirmed the district
court, it refused to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine as the trial
court did, explaining that the doctrine had been applied by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court only in "unique factual situations":
Unlike the district court, we rest our decision purely on the legal
pronouncement of Standard Venetian that unclear contractual
provisions will be construed against the insurer and do not rely
upon the holdings of the two Pennsylvania cases relied upon by
the district court, Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. and Tonkovic v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. We believe that the
holdings of these cases were firmly rooted in their unique factual
situations and decline to apply them to the facts here.24 2
In Lucker Manufacturing v. Home Insurance Co.,243 decided in 1994, the
Third Circuit interpreted a property damage provision of a comprehen-
sive general liability policy.244 The court did not discuss the reasonable
expectations doctrine when determining coverage, but employed tradi-
tional rules of contract construction, including the principle that a court
must construe ambiguous language to provide coverage. 245
236. 966 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1992).
237. See Langer, 966 F.2d at 798 (addressing contract formation by premium
payment acceptance).
238. Id.
239. See id. (reversing district court ruling).
240. 973 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1992).
241. See Worldwide Underwriters, 973 F.2d at 196.
242. Id. at 196 n.3 (citations omitted).
243. 23 F.3d 808 (3d Cir. 1994).
244. See Lucker Mfg., 23 F.3d at 810 (discussing general issue of case).
245. See id. at 814 (stating that traditional principles of insurance policy inter-
pretation control inquiry into coverage).
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It was not until 1994, in Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines
Insurance Co.,2 4 6 that the Third Circuit again discussed the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine at length. In Bensalem Township, the township con-
tracted with the insurance company for a policy covering all civil claims
made against the township. 247 Included in the agreement was an exclu-
sion that barred coverage on any claim arising from litigation initiated
before the policy became effective.24 8 When the township renewed its cov-
erage in 1989, the insurance company inserted a provision broadening the
exclusion to include all claims related to any prior matter. 249 In other
words, the extent of the township's coverage was limited only to claims
unrelated to any prior matter.250 The township was sued by a third party
and was subsequently denied coverage by the insurance company under
the added provision in the policy.25 ' The township contended that the
language added by the insurance company was counter to its reasonable
expectations because, although it was aware of the older exclusion, it be-
lieved it was receiving the same policy when it renewed coverage. 25 2
During its lengthy discussion of the development of the reasonable
expectations doctrine in Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit noted that, with
the Standard Venetian Blind decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "ap-
peared to pull back from its enthusiastic endorsement of the [reasonable
expectations] doctrine."253 The court further acknowledged the difficulty
in distinguishing those cases in which the Pennsylvania courts applied the
reasonable expectations doctrine and those that enforced the unambigu-
ous terms of the policy. 254 But the Third Circuit was confident that Penn-
sylvania would apply the doctrine in circumstances where equitable
estoppel would be warranted, as when the insurer either actively provides
misinformation about the scope of coverage provided by a policy or pas-
sively fails to notify the insured that it was receiving something other than
what it thought it purchased. 25 5 The court stated the following:
Faced with Collister, Standard Venetian Blind, and Tonkovic, we are
unable to draw any categorical distinction between the types of
cases in which Pennsylvania courts will allow the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured to defeat the unambiguous language of
an insurance policy and those in which the courts will follow the
246. 38 F.3d 1303 (3d Cir. 1994).
247. See Bensalem Township, 38 F.3d at 1304.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 1304-05.
253. Id. at 1310.
254. See id. at 1311 (discussing lack of consistency in courts' reasoning in ap-
plying different doctrines).
255. See id. at 1311-12 (acknowledging that in such circumstances, insured's
reasonable expectations will prevail over policy's terms).
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general rule of adhering to the precise terms of the policy. One
theme that emerges from all the cases, however, is that courts are
to be chary about allowing insurance companies to abuse their
position vis-a-vis their customers. Thus we are confident that
where the insurer or its agent creates in the insured a reasonable
expectation of coverage that is not supported by the terms of the
policy that expectation will prevail over the language of the
policy.256
The Third Circuit noted that in Standard Venetian Blind, the insurer
neither misled the insured nor unilaterally changed the terms of coverage
after the insured had agreed to purchase insurance.25 7
Although reversing the district court because it should have permit-
ted the insured to pursue discovery to establish its reasonable expecta-
tions, the court of appeals in Bensalem made it clear that the Township
could not defeat the unambiguous policy exclusion unless it showed that it
was misled by the insurer or that the insurer failed in its duty to notify the
Township of the changes in the renewal policy. 258 Judge Hutchinson,
who, as a former Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court participated
in the Standard Venetian Blind decision, wrote a concurring opinion in
which he attempted to reconcile Standard Venetian Blind with the reasona-
ble expectations doctrine. He opined that the court in Standard Venetian
Blind did not reject "the reasonable expectations principle foreshadowed
in Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., Inc."259 Rather, Judge Hutchinson
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "did no more" than re-
ject the attempt of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hionis "to wholly
divorce the construction of exclusionary clauses from their text."260
The Third Circuit next addressed the reasonable expectations doc-
trine in 1995, when it decided Granite State Insurance Co. v. Aamco Transmis-
sions, Inc.26 1 In Granite, the Third Circuit interpreted a provision of a
comprehensive general liability insurance policy that provided coverage
for "'personal injury or advertising injury . . .arising out of the conduct
of" the insured's business. 262 The insured, an automotive transmission
repair business, was sued by its customers for using "deceptive advertising
which did not describe its services accurately and which lured purchasers
256. Id. at 1311.
257. See id. at 1312 n.5 (stating that Standard Venetian Blind involved insured
who had no reasonable expectation that policy provided coverage which, in fact, it
did not).
258. See id. at 1312 (stating insurers must prevail unless they represented that
coverage would not be reduced or they notified insured of change in coverage
after policy was renewed).
259. Id. at 1315 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
260. Id. (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
261. 57 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 1995).
262. Granite State Ins., 57 F.3d at 318 (quoting policy).
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of transmission services into paying more than they should have paid and
induced them to pay for unnecessary repairs."263
The insurance company brought a declaratory judgment action seek-
ing a determination that it was not obligated to provide coverage to the
automobile repair business for the claims made by the customer. The dis-
trict court granted the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
finding that the customer's claims did not constitute "advertising injury" as
defined by the policy. The policy defined "advertising injury" as an "injury
arising ... in the course of... advertising activities, if such injury arises
out of libel, slander, defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy, un-
fair competition, or infringement of copyright, title or slogan." 264 The
Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the false advertising claims against
the insured did not arise from "unfair competition." 265 Specifically, the
court stated that "a competitor of the insured, but not its customer, can
assert a claim which may be covered under the 'unfair competition' cate-
gory of the 'advertising injury' coverage." 266 The court rejected the in-
sured's reliance on the reasonable expectations doctrine and found,
without the benefit of a record made in the trial court, that the insured
could not have had a reasonable expectation of coverage. 267 The Third
Circuit stated:
We have not overlooked [the insured's] argument "that the
proper focus regarding issues of coverage under insurance con-
tracts is the reasonable expectation of the insured," as set forth in
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett. Rather, we conclude that [the
insured] could not have expected to have insurance coverage for
the [customers'] claims under the portion of a policy protecting
it against claims of "unfair competition." As we explained above,
it would be expected that a claim arising from "competition"
would be forwarded by a competitor of an insured. The [custom-
ers] were not competitors of [the insured].268
In contrast to the ruling in Bensalem Township, the court in Granite did not
give the insured the opportunity to take discovery to develop its claim that
its reasonable expectations of coverage were not fulfilled. As it did in Se-
lected Risks Insurance Co. v. Bruno,269 the Third Circuit held that it was un-
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 319 (stating that "regardless of the nature of the insured's con-
duct, a claim by a consumer of its products or services arising from that conduct
hardly can be characterized as a claim for unfair competition").
266. Id. at 320.
267. See id. at 321 (finding no reasonable expectation of coverage against un-
fair competition claim by noncompetitor).
268. Id. at 321 (citations omitted).
269. 718 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1983).
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reasonable as a matter of law for the insured to expect coverage for the
customer's claims.
The next opportunity for the Third Circuit to address insurance law
came in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Moessner.270 The issue presented in Reli-
ance relevant to this discussion was whether Moessner's employer, Vapor
Energy Service and Engineering Corporation ("VE"), had a reasonable ex-
pectation of coverage under a renewed policy when the original policy
would have covered the type of injury suffered by Moessner. 271 Plaintiff,
Moessner, sought monetary damages after he was overcome by carbon
monoxide emitted by a VE evaporator.27 2 VE submitted to Reliance a re-
quest for coverage for the Moessner claim, but was told that the Total
Pollution Exclusion contained in the policy relieved Reliance of any obli-
gation to defend or indemnify VE. 2 7 3 Under the original policy, Reliance
would have been obligated to provide coverage for Moessner's claims. 274
VE contended that Reliance's interpretation of the policy and exclusions
were contrary to the reasonable expectations of VE. 2 7 5
The Third Circuit properly considered the threshold argument that
the insurance policy was ambiguous; 2 76 the court concluded that the clear
language of the policy was unambiguous and would bar coverage. 277 The
court then turned to an examination of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine and offered a slightly modified and more accurate version of Penn-
sylvania's reasonable expectations doctrine than articulated by the West
American court.278 The court stated that "even the most clearly written
exclusion will not bind the insured where the insurer or its agent has cre-
ated in the insured a reasonable expectation of coverage."2 79 The court
also said that "[i]n light of Standard Venetian Blind and Tonkovic, Penn-
sylvania courts have consistently enforced the plain language of exclusions
and limitations, despite the insurer's failure to make the insured aware of
270. 121 F.3d 895 (3d Cir. 1997).
271. See Selected Risks Ins., 121 F.3d at 897 (recognizing one of two important
issues on appeal).
272. See id. at 898.
273. See id. The insurance policy at issue provided coverage for obligations of
the insured as a result of bodily injury or property for products sold by VE. See id.
at 899 (analyzing terms of insurance policy). The total pollution exclusion con-
tained in the original policy would not have precluded coverage in this case. See id.
The total pollution exclusion in the renewed policy excluded coverage for any
bodily injury or property damage which would have not occurred but for the re-
lease of pollutants. See id. at 899-900.
274. See id. at 899.
275. See id. at 898.
276. See id. at 900-01 (stating that if insurance policy is ambiguous, it "should
be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer").
277. See id. at 901 (applying precedent from Pennsylvania Superior Court
decisions).
278. See id. at 903-04 (analyzing reasonable expectations doctrine in
Pennsylvania).
279. Id. at 903.
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the provisions, where the circumstances indicate that the insured received
exactly the coverage requested."280 This interpretation, again, differs
slightly from the more expansive description of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine by the Third Circuit in West American.28 ' The language of
Reliance is more closely analogous to the estoppel application of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine that was applied by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Tonkovic and by the Third Circuit in West American and
Bensalem Township.282
The Third Circuit in Reliance also rejected the insurer's argument that
the reasonable expectations doctrine should not apply to a commercial
insured. Given the facts presented in Reliance, the court gave two persua-
sive reasons for its decision. First, even though sophisticated insureds may
exercise more bargaining power over an insurer, "the rationale of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine is still applicable when the insurer unilater-
ally alters the insurance coverage requested by the insured."28 3 When an
insured has no reason to know that the insurer inserted an unfavorable
provision in the policy, the insured lacks the ability to negotiate a more
favorable policy and "its sophistication or putative bargaining power is
meaningless."28 4 Second, Pennsylvania courts have also construed ambig-
uous policy terms in favor of the insured, whether the insured was a com-
mercial entity or an unsophisticated consumer. 28 5 The Third Circuit in
Reliance correctly predicted that the Pennsylvania courts would apply the
reasonable expectations doctrine to sophisticated insurers in the particu-
lar circumstances presented in Reliance, even though in Madison Construc-
tion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later intimated in dicta that the
doctrine is limited to "non-commercial insureds."28 6 As the Third Circuit
280. Id. at 904 n.7 (citations omitted).
281. Compare Reliance, 121 F.3d at 904 (stating that Pennsylvania courts en-
force plain language of insurance agreement including all exclusions and limita-
tions when insured receives coverage requested), with West Am. Ins. Co. v. Park,
933 F.2d 1236, 1240 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that Pennsylvania law forbids insurer to
use explicit language of insurance contract to defeat insured's reasonable
expectations).
282. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. VE Corp., No. CIV.A.95-538, 2000 WL
217511, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2000) (noting VE reasonably expected coverage
from first policy to continue to new policy). On remand, the district court also
applied the estoppel principle and held that VE reasonably expected coverage so
the total pollution exclusion was unenforceable. See id. (stating first policy provi-
sion controls over new one). The court noted, "[t]he insurer will be equitably
estopped from asserting an exclusionary clause in a renewal policy unless it meets
its burden of proving that it both notified the insured and explained the signifi-
cance of the change." Id. at *9.
283. Reliance, 121 F.3d at 905.
284. Id.
285. See id. (citing numerous Pennsylvania cases constraining ambiguous in-
surance policies in favor of insured commercial entities over insurers).
286. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 109
n.8 (Pa. 1999) (suggesting limitation to reasonable expectations doctrine). Al-
though dicta by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may provide "a federal court with
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explained, the insured's level of expertise in insurance matters will always
be an important factor to consider when resolving whether the insured's
expectation of coverage is reasonable. 28 7 In circumstances like those
presented in Tonkovic and Reliance, however, the rationale for applying the
reasonable expectations doctrine will always apply, even when the insured
is a sophisticated consumer.2 88
The two most recent pronouncements of the Third Circuit on this
matter take a more expansive view of Pennsylvania's reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine than the Third Circuit did in Reliance. In the first case, Med-
ical Protective Co. v. Watkins,28 9 the Third Circuit indicated a willingness to
apply the reasonable expectations doctrine, even if the expectation of cov-
erage was not created by the insurer.290 Medical Protective involved a mal-
practice insurance policy issued to Watkins, a dentist.29 ' The policy
provided coverage for any claim of damage for services rendered by the
insured or any other person for whom the insured was legally responsi-
ble.29 2 The policy contained an important exclusion ("Exclusion 100"),
which excluded coverage arising from the administration of any form of
anesthesia in a dosage designed to render the patient unconscious, unless
administered in a hospital. 293 The policy also contained a section that
provided coverage for any liability incurred in rendering professional ser-
vices under any contract with another dentist or other provider of profes-
sional services. 294 Reading these two provisions together, Dr. Watkins
assumed that Exclusion 100 did not apply to him, and that he was pro-
tected from the actions of outside contractors for professional services per-
formed in his office. 295
As the Third Circuit noted, the facts of the case were tragic. 29 6 The
case arose out of a wrongful death action filed against Dr. Watkins by the
parents of a three-year old boy who died while under the care of Dr. Wat-
reliable indicia of how the state tribunal may rule on a particular question," it is
obviously not binding and, in fact, "a federal court should be circumspect in sur-
rendering its own judgment concerning what the state law is on account of dicta."
McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980).
287. See Reliance, 121 F.3d at 906 (predicting Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
application of reasonable expectations doctrine).
288. See Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920, 926 (Pa.
1987) (explaining that reasonable expectations doctrine applies in this case); see
also Reliance, 121 F.3d at 906 (same).
289. 198 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1999).
290. See Medical Protective, 198 F.3d at 106 (stating analysis of reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine). According to Professor Henderson, application of the doc-
trine in this way can lead to great uncertainty. See Henderson, supra note 46, at 828
(discussing opinions from highest courts of several states).
291. See id. at 101.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 101-02.
294. See id. at 102.
295. See id.
296. See id.
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kins and an outside anesthesiologist who had administered the anesthesia
in Dr. Watkins' office. 297 The insurance company agreed to provide a
conditional defense for Dr. Watkins against the charges that he did not
obtain the consent of the parents before prescribing the anesthesia, and
that he was negligent in the treatment of the boy after the child suffered
cardiac arrest as a result of the anesthesia.298
The Third Circuit correctly started its analysis by considering whether
there were any ambiguous terms in the policy. 299 The court then relied
on McMillan in construing the policy provision against the insurer.30 0 The
court accepted the contention by Dr. Watkins that there was more than
one reasonable interpretation of the clause contained in Exclusion 100,
which excluded from coverage "any liability arising from the administra-
tion of any form of anesthesia in dosage designed to render the patient
unconscious unless administered in a hospital."3 0 1 The court reasoned
that this clause failed to specify a person or class of persons to whom the
exclusion applied.30 2 The court further accepted Dr. Watkins' testimony
at trial that he believed he was covered, based on his own interpretation of
the clause, because he personally did not administer the anesthesia.3 0 3
The court concluded that exclusionary clauses for professional services,
such as Exclusion 100, must refer to a specific class of persons.
30 4
Under Pennsylvania law, the inquiry could have ended with the
court's conclusion that the provision was ambiguous and must be con-
strued against the insurer. In several previous decisions, the Third Circuit
ended its analysis after finding an insurance policy ambiguous. 30 5 Perhaps
because the Third Circuit wished to reinforce its ambiguity analysis, how-
ever, it went on to devote a considerable discussion to the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine as applied to this case, promoting a position close to
297. See id.
298. See id. at 102-03 (stating that insurance company sought declaratoryjudg-
ment to determine its obligations).
299. See id. at 103 (discussing applicable Pennsylvania law governing insur-
ance policy rules).
300. See id. at 104 (stating that policies that can be interpreted in many differ-
ent ways are ambiguous). In McMillan, the Third Circuit remarked that
"[a]mbiguous provisions in an insurance policy must be construed against the in-
surer and in favor of the insured; any reasonable interpretation offered by the
insured therefore must control." McMillan v. State Mut. Life Ass'n, 922 F.2d 1073,
1075 (3d Cir. 1990).
301. Medical Protective, 198 F.3d at 104.
302. See id.
303. See id. (recounting testimony of Watkins).
304. See id. at 105.
305. See, e.g., 12th St. Gym, Inc. v. General Star Indem. Co., 93 F.3d 115, 166
(3d Cir. 1996) (ending analysis and remanding after finding extrinsic evidence
insufficient to resolve ambiguity in insurance policy); Worldwide Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding insurer entitled to policy
benefits because of policy's ambiguity); McMillan, 922 F.2d at 1080 (same); Hough-
ton v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
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one that advocates always adhering to the reasonable expectations of the
insured regardless of clear policy provisions. The court suggested that Dr.
Watkins' own impressions and assumptions regarding what was covered
and what was not covered by his policy must prevail even if the court had
not found the exclusion to be ambiguous. 30 6 In other words, the court
suggested that the doctrine of reasonable expectations would apply even
though the insurer did not create the insured's reasonable expectations of
coverage.
In construing Pennsylvania law so broadly, the Medical Protective court
relied upon the overly expansive language in West American, which misin-
terpreted Pennsylvania law to provide that "the insurer is bound not only
by the expectations that it creates, but also by any other reasonable expec-
tation of the insured. The insured's reasonable expectations control, even
if they are contrary to the explicit terms of the policy."3 0 7 As explained
earlier when addressing the West American case, this statement expands the
reasonable expectations doctrine beyond the limited applications author-
ized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Third Circuit in Reliance, on
the other hand, correctly held that Pennsylvania law requires that policy
language must be enforced when it is clear and unambiguous, unless the
insurer has created by action, or omission when there is a duty to act, a
contrary reasonable expectation of coverage. An insured cannot complain
that his reasonable expectations are defeated by clear and unambiguous
policy language, absent some misleading action by the insurer.
The most recent Third Circuit case to address Pennsylvania's reasona-
ble expectations doctrine is Bowersox Truck Sales & Service, Inc. v. Harco
National Insurance Co.3 0 8 In that case, the insured sued a commercial
property insurer for breach of contract and bad faith arising from the in-
surer's refusal to pay a business interruption claim for a period during
which the insured's premises were being replaced.3 0 9 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer because the insured
did not file the action within the two-year limitations period contained in
the policy. 3 10 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 311 After re-
viewing the policy language, the court of appeals found that the district
court erred in interpreting the policy to provide that the time period for
filing suit began when the property was damaged, instead of when the
necessary reconstruction was completed. 312 Although the court of appeals
could have ended its analysis there, it did not. Instead, the court found
306. See Medical Protective, 198 F.3d at 106-07 (finding genuine issue of mate-
rial fact).
307. Id. at 106 (quoting West Am. Ins. Co. v. Park, 933 F.2d 1236, 1239 (3d Cir.
1991)).
308. 209 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2000).
309. See Bowersox, 209 F.3d at 274.
310. See id. at 277.
311. See id. at 274.
312. See id. at 278.
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that the course of dealing between the parties created a reasonable expec-
tation in the insured that the two-year clock was not ticking until after the
reconstruction was completed.31 3 The court noted that two years after the
damage, the insurance company was still requesting documentation from
the insured about its losses. 314 Thus, application of the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine by the court here, as in West American, Bensalem Township
and Reliance, was in the nature of equitable estoppel.
Although Pennsylvania law applied to the case, the court of appeals,
nonetheless, cited one of its previous cases interpreting New Jersey law
3 15
for the broad proposition that a court must interpret an insurance con-
tract "to accord with the reasonable expectations of the insured, regardless
of any ambiguity in the policy."3 16 As noted earlier, this language is not
precisely reflective of the limited application by Pennsylvania courts of the
reasonable expectations doctrine.31 7 Although the court of appeals
reached the correct result in Bowersox, it unnecessarily injected overly
broad language from NewJersey law to describe Pennsylvania's reasonable
expectations doctrine.3 18
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has faced a
formidable task when applying Pennsylvania's reasonable expectations
doctrine in diversity cases, in large part because the doctrine has under-
gone significant changes since being adopted by the Pennsylvania courts
in 1974. Although the Third Circuit in Bensalem Township found it difficult
to categorize those Pennsylvania decisions that applied the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine and those which strictly applied Standard Venetian
Blind, certain principles are constant and should be considered by the fed-
eral courts when applying this difficult area of Pennsylvania law.
313. See id. at 279 (stating that "BTS could not have reasonably expected that
the two-year clock was ticking").
314. See id. at 278-79.
315. See id. at 279 (citing Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143,
154 (3d Cir. 1998)). In Murray, the court of appeals quoted from Sparks v. St. Paul
Insurance Co., that "[t]he interpretation of insurance contracts to accord with the
reasonable expectations of the insured, regardless of the existence of any ambigu-
ity in the policy, constitutes judicial recognition of the unique nature of contracts
of insurance." 495 A.2d 406, 414 (N.J. 1985). In Sparks, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an unambiguous "claims made" policy issued to a lawyer to cover
malpractice claims, afforded no retroactive coverage during its initial year of issu-
ance, did not accord with the objectively reasonable expectations of the purchasers
of professional liability insurance and was violative of the public policy of New
Jersey. See id. Sparks did not require any misrepresentations or omissions on the
part of the insurer as a prerequisite to the recovery by the insured.
316. Bowersox, 209 F.3d at 279 (quoting Murray, 145 F.3d at 154).
317. For a further discussion of the limited application by Pennsylvania courts
of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see supra notes 73-185 and accompanying
text.
318. See Bowersox, 209 F.3d at 279 (citing New Jersey law).
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First, although Pennsylvania appeared to enthusiastically endorse the
reasonable expectations doctrine in Collister, as noted by the Third Circuit,
it has since "pulled back" from this application of the doctrine.3 19 What
has emerged is a variation of the equitable estoppel doctrine that should
be applied in "very limited circumstances," as suggested recently by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.3 20 This limited reasonable expectations
doctrine can be summarized as follows: When the policy language is am-
biguous, it must be construed in accordance with the insured's reasonable
interpretation and there is no need to delve further into the reasonable
expectations doctrine.3 21 When the policy language is unambiguous,
courts should presume, as the Third Circuit did in Bensalem Township, that
in "most cases, the language of an insurance policy will provide the best
indication of the content of the parties' reasonable expectations."3 22
Courts should only deviate from the policy language if the insured can
show that the language of the policy does not reflect the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured because:
The insurer has either passively or actively misled that insured as
to the scope of coverage provided by the policy, or where the
insurer has unilaterally made a change in the terms of coverage
after the insured has agreed to purchase insurance without in-
forming the insured of the change and its consequences.
3 23
319. See Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d
1303, 1310 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Standard Venetian Blind for proposition that
where coverage is clear, insured may not avoid consequences that they did not
read).
320. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 109
n.8 (Pa. 1999) (declining to further expand on these limited circumstances).
321. See, e.g., Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192 (3d Cir.
1992) (using insured's reasonable interpretation avoided muddling Pennsylvania
insurance coverage law with unnecessary exposition of reasonable expectations
doctrine); Gamble Farm Ins., Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (same).
322. Bensalem Township, 38 F.3d at 1309.
323. Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.96-8481, 1997 WL
255483 at *12 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (Newcomer, J.). Several other judges in the
Third Circuit have also suggested that Pennsylvania's reasonable expectations doc-
trine is essentially an estoppel principle applicable to insurance companies. See,
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reidler, No. CIV.A.99-4463, 2000 WL 424286, at *5
n.6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2000) (Katz, J.) ("[T] here is both Third Circuit and Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court precedent suggesting the reasonable expectations doc-
trine should be applied in limited circumstances to protect individuals who are
forced to rely on the oral representations of an insurance agent because of the
document's complexity."); Reliance Ins. Co. v. VE Corp., No. CIV.A.95-538, 2000
WL 217511, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2000) (Scuderi, M.J.) ("The insurer will be
equitably estopped from asserting an exclusionary clause in a renewal policy unless
it meets its burden of proving that it both notified the insured and explained the
significance of the change."); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. B & D Milmont Inn,
Inc., No. CIV.A.95-CV-6039, 1996 WL 745297, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1996) (Kelly,
J.) ("Two scenarios where the reasonable expectations of the insured are frustrated
and the court will avoid an unambiguous exclusion in an insurance policy exist
2000]
43
Rueter and Roberts: Pennsylvania's Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: The Third Circui
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
ViLLANovA LAW REVIEW
Stated another way, if the insured has an expectation of coverage that is
inconsistent with the language of the policy, this alone cannot defeat clear
and unambiguous policy language unless the insurance company shares
some blame for the erroneous expectation of coverage. 324 To the extent
the Third Circuit in West American, Medical Protective and Bowersox suggested
that an insured's reasonable expectation of coverage always should prevail
over clear and ambiguous policy language, even when that expectation
was not created by the insurer, that language should be rejected by the
court as inconsistent with Pennsylvania law.
Second, Pennsylvania's reasonable expectations doctrine, although
grounded in equitable estoppel, is a more relaxed standard for an insured
to satisfy than the traditional equitable estoppel doctrine. Equitable estop-
pel applies "when one by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other
rightfully relies and acts on such belief' to his detriment.325 Under Penn-
sylvania law, the party asserting estoppel must establish its application by
"clear, precise and unequivocal evidence." 326 Pennsylvania's reasonable
expectations doctrine does not require the insured to prove by such a high
standard of proof that the insurer created a reasonable expectation of cov-
erage. The cases seem to suggest that a preponderance of the evidence is
all that is required.3 27 Furthermore, given the nature of the insurance
industry, the requirement of reliance is substantially lessened under the
where 1) the insurer unilaterally changes the terms of a policy and does not make
the insured aware of the change and 2) where the insured requests specific cover-
age that the insurer fails to provide."); Bensalem Township v. Coregis Indem. Co.,
CIV.A. No. 91-5315, 1995 WL 290438, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1995) (Dalzell, J.)
(stating that "[a]s the Third Circuit noted in Bensalem Township, underlying both
Collister and Tonkovic are the more generic principles of estoppel"), affd, 77 F.2d
461 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Gianchristoforo v. Mission Gas &
Oil Prods., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Katz, J.) ("Pennsylvania
law applies the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the construction of insurance
policies where necessary to achieve fundamental fairness because the insurance
public's reasonable expectations are the touchstone of contract interpretation,
even if contrary to the policy's terms.").
324. See Minstretta v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., CIV.A. No. 87-5779, 1989 WL
97753, at *3 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1989) (suggesting that insured does not have
to show intent to mislead on part of insurer). "An estoppel may arise even though
there was no intent to mislead." Id.
325. Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, 27 A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. 1942),
quoted in Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 76 n.4 (Pa. 1974).
326. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 746 F.2d 200, 206
(3d Cir. 1984); accord Continental Ins. Co. v. Alperin, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-1008,
1998 WL 212767, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1998) (discussing elements of equitable
estoppel); Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Siskind, 457 A.2d 502, 504 (Pa. 1983)
(same).
327. Cf Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that based upon questions in application for insurance and deposition
testimony of insured, jury could find that insured reasonably believed he was cov-
ered under policy).
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reasonable expectations doctrine.3 28 Pennsylvania courts have recognized
that because of the nature of insurance policies, insureds are not expected
to read them and may reasonably rely upon the representations and sum-
maries of insurance companies and their agents as to the scope of
coverage.3
29
Finally, federal courts should be hesitant to expand the reasonable
expectations doctrine beyond the estoppel principles just described. Only
two members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who participated in the
Tonkovic decision presently sit on the court. These two justices, Chief Jus-
tice Flaherty and Justice Zappala, both dissented in Tonkovic. No other
member of the present supreme court has joined an opinion of that court
endorsing the reasonable expectations doctrine. Furthermore, a majority
of the court in Madison Construction recently expressed their reluctance to
expand the doctrine beyond the unique facts of Collister and Tonkovic.
33 0
Therefore, although we cannot confirm the accuracy of the superior
court's statement made in 1995 that the reasonable expectations doctrine
"does not command a majority of our Supreme Court," it appears clear
that the state's highest court will apply the doctrine only as an equitable
estoppel principle, modified to address the unique relationship between
an insurer and an insured.
331
328. See, e.g., Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 369-70 (Pa.
1977) (discussing insurance industry).
329. See, e.g., id. at 368-70 (discussing facts of case and analysis of decision).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, construing New Jersey's
reasonable expectations doctrine, has suggested that "[t]he doctrine differs from
estoppel in that it does not require proof of reliance; rather, courts examine con-
tractual language from the point of view of 'the average member of the public.'"
Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Kievit
v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 26 (N.J. 1961)). The Third Circuit in
Reliance, construing Pennsylvania law, held the reasonable expectations doctrine
applies to sophisticated insureds, but suggested that reliance is still a consideration
since it held that the level of sophistication of the insured is relevant to determine
the reasonableness of the insured's expectation of coverage. See Reliance Ins. Co.
v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 905 (3d. Cir. 1997) (stating standard required for so-
phisticated insured). If an insured's expectation of coverage is based upon misrep-
resentations of coverage, a sophisticated insured would still be required to show
that it relied on the representations and that it was reasonable to do so. See id. at
906 (noting that "it would deem the insured's status to be a factor considered
when resolving whether the insured acted reasonably in expecting a given claim to
be covered").
330. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 109
n.8 (Pa. 1999) (limiting reasonable expectations doctrine).
331. See, e.g., Gamble Farms Ins., Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 144
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (discussing manner in which ambiguities are resolved be-
tween insured and insurer).
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